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ABSTRACT 
Cooperation and joint actions are often investigated in terms of how individuals explicitly 
coordinate their plans and intentions to achieve a shared goal. However, goals may also be 
achieved without prior arrangements, when, for instance, an individual takes part in 
someone else’s action without an explicit agreement, helping that action to be performed. 
Participating in social interaction may be considered as a basic form of cooperation that 
does not always require verbal communication or the ability to predict the other’s 
intentions. Rather, it is based on daily experiences of interacting and coordinating with 
others in many, different situations. 
Framed in this way, cooperative participation can be explored even in those who do 
not possess high mental abilities, such as infants. Indeed, infants seem to have a natural 
motive to engage in social interactions (Trevarthen, 19791). How does this participation 
develop from early forms of social interactions in infancy, to more complex types of 
interactions later on? Are there early forms of interactive participation in infancy that can 
be described as supportive for the caregivers’ action? The aim of the present Ph.D. work is 
to explore the way in which infants participate in daily routines, through the observation of 
                                                
1Trevarthen, C. (1979). Communication and cooperation in early infancy: a 
description of primary intersubjectivity. In M. Bullowa (Ed.), Before Speech. The 
beginning of interpersonal communication (321-348). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
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3-months-old infants’ behaviour in familiar interactions and their response to violations of 
these routines.  
Chapter two presents a critical reflection, developed with Hanne de Jaegher, on 
inferential, representational accounts of cooperation by analytical philosophy and 
experimental psychology. A theoretical reconceptualization of cooperative interactions as 
social encounters is proposed, framed within the theoretical tenets of enactivism.  
Chapter three investigates the structure and function of early social games, 
considered as early contexts for participation in distributed actions. Through behavioural 
observations, this study suggested that changes in the multimodal format of the play 
routines affected the infant’s behaviour and participation in the play interaction. 
Chapter four extends the exploration of infants’ cooperative participation in joint 
routines, observing infants’ behaviour when being picked up. Infants showed specific 
cooperative adjustments of the body to complement the mother’s action when being picked 
up, as opposed to un-supportive loss of bodily tension and head strength when the pick-up 
action was delayed. Participation in this joint routine thus appeared to be conditional to 
aspects of timing and recognition of the mothers’ movements in the sequence, without 
relying on inferential knowledge.  
Chapter five focuses on intrusiveness, a maternal behaviour that has been described 
as strongly affecting the infant’s participation in early interactions. In a joint work with 
Laura Galbusera, a qualitative microanalysis was applied to explore the sequential 
organisation of mother-infant exchanges to investigate 1) the consistency of current 
behavioural descriptions of intrusiveness and 2) their efficacy in analysing the interactional 
dynamics which may restrict the infant’s participation in interaction. A microanalysis 
inspired by Conversation Analysis methods revealed that interactional dimensions such as 
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persistency, alignment, sequential structuring and timing appeared to be essential elements 
for the interactional organisation and the shaping the possibility for the infant’s 
participation.  
The sixth and final chapter summarises the findings emerged throughout the thesis 
and discusses some key features of infants’ cooperative participation.  
By integrating different approaches investigating intersubjective encounters, such as 
Enactivism, Conversation Analysis and Infant Research, this dissertation has explored 
cooperation as an aspect of social participation that evolves within human interactions, but 
is also already grounded in infants’ interactional competencies. This comprehensive 
approach has provided much needed insight into the importance of widening the concept of 
cooperation and its development, considering joint routines as multimodal contexts in 
everyday life where infants (but also adults) learn to understand, make sense of, and align 
with the other’s actions and affects, without relying on inferential processes. 
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1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The ability to cooperate has received increasing attention over the past years, particularly 
by researchers from analytical philosophy, developmental and comparative psychology. 
Cooperation has been described as the “coordinated, synchronous activity that is the result 
of a continued attempt to construct and maintain a shared conception of a problem” 
(Teasley & Roschelle, 1993), or, more basically, as consisting in “i) acting or working 
together and ii) a common or the same end or purpose” (Tuomela 2000, p. 3). One of the 
reasons why cooperation has been considered such an important topic in the past two 
decades, is its role in exploring differences between humans and other animals (especially 
great apes) (Tomasello, 2009). Moll and Tomasello (2007) have argued that “among 
primates, humans are by far the most cooperative species, in just about any way this 
appellation is used [in] cooperative institutions and social practices with shared goals and 
differentiated roles” (p.1). From a developmental point of view, it is relevant to investigate 
how cooperation develops. How do we, as humans, learn to support each other and 
participate in cooperative interactions? 
On the one hand, developmental research during the ‘70s and ‘80s has mostly 
focused on the cooperative aspects of language acquisition in early face-to-face mother-
infant interactions (Bruner, 1977; Trevarthen, 1979), yet has paid little attention to how 
infants cooperatively participate in other kinds of early structured routines. On the other 
hand, current developmental research on cooperation has restricted its exploration to a 
range of pre-defined situations, e.g. problem solving tasks, where understanding the other’s 
intentions is necessary to accomplish a joint goal. In other words, cooperation is seen as 
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based on a primarily inferential ability (see, for example, Brownell et al., 2006). However, 
an inferential and strictly cognitive account may not be the most adequate framework to 
study how cooperation emerges in typical and atypical developmental trajectories. As 
Butterfill (2012) argues, “we need a further account of joint action, one that is compatible 
with the premise that joint action plays a role in explaining how humans develop abilities to 
think about minds” (p.24).  
The work presented in this thesis integrates the definition of cooperation arising 
from infant research “that each of the subjects is taking account of the other's interests and 
objectives in some relation to the extrapersonal context, and is acting to complement the 
other's response” (Hubley & Trevarthen, 1979, p. 58), with the ethnomethodological view 
of cooperation as an intrinsic element of the process of interacting, where “each party 
builds upon structure provided by others” (Goodwin, 2013, p. 17). The overarching aims of 
this thesis are 1) to develop a non-inferential view on cooperation; and 2) to explore how 
infants become cooperative participants in contexts of natural co-actions with their 
caregivers, namely, joint routines. The framework chosen for this investigation combines 
an observational method with a dynamical systems approach, by applying microanalytical 
behavioural observations. As a result, selected behaviours of the infants and the mothers 
were coded and compared, along with multidimensional, qualitative descriptions of mother-
infant interactions. 
Chapter two presents a joint theoretical work with Hanne de Jaegher2, which 
challenges mainstream inferential accounts calling for a more embodied view of 
                                                
2Dr. Hanne de Jaegher is a philosopher and postdoctoral researcher at the University 
of the Basque Country, San Sebastian, Spain. Chapter 2 is the result of our collaboration for 
a publication in which she is co-author (please see Dissemination section). 
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cooperation. Integrating an enactive theoretical framework with central tenets of 
ethnomethodology, the work describes situations in which cooperating is not simply an 
individual behaviour, but also a basic interactional requirement. It then moves on with 
presenting findings from studies demonstrating basic cooperative participation in 
individuals with difficulties in mind-reading (especially infants or children with autism). In 
the conclusions, it is proposed that cooperation is a form of participating in each other’s 
sense-making; a way of being with others that we, as human, learn along the way, which 
does not require an a priori knowledge of the other’s intentions. 
In chapter three and four cooperative participation is specifically investigated 
through two observational studies on 3-months-old infants engaged in a joint routine with 
their mothers, and the effects of its violation. The first study describes early familiar 
nursery-rhymes games as played multi-modally (voice and gestures together) or uni-
modally. The results show that infants decreased their participation when the game format 
was altered, that is, when the auditory and motor modalities were separated, suggesting that 
infants’ participation is conditional to the recognition of the game as an integrated unit of 
sound and gestures. The second study investigates infants’ behaviour during pick-up 
interactions, either performed normally or with a short delay after the action has started. 
The findings suggest that online adjustments are contingently performed already at 3 
months of age, supporting and complementing the maternal actions. At the same time, 
when the pick-up flow is delayed and the mother’s action becomes unintelligible, infants 
decrease their bodily support and cease to participate in the interaction.  
20 
Chapter five is a joint study with Laura Galbusera3, in which we explore and discuss 
the behavioural category of intrusiveness as deployed in studies on postpartum depression. 
Intrusiveness has been generally described in terms of maternal behaviours which restrict 
the infant’s participation. A microanalysis of five episodes of mother-infant interactions, 
informed by Conversation Analysis methods, aimed at identifying features of mother’s 
interactional conduct facilitating vs. hampering reciprocity and attunement. The 
microanalysis reveals that interactional dimensions such as persistency, responsivity, 
sequential parsing and timing are essential elements affecting the quality of interaction. 
Looking at these aspects may be more revealing of the ways in which infants and mothers 
(with or without a diagnosis of depression) interact, than adopting a pre-defined set of 
descriptors to define maternal behaviour as intrusive.  
The question of how cooperative participation develops in infancy is discussed in 
chapter six, drawing on the findings and reviews presented in the thesis. Three aspects are 
specifically considered and discussed: the interactional organisation, multimodality and 
predictability.  
The findings from this work constitute one of the first explicit attempts to describe 
the development of early cooperative participation in infants. By integrating different 
approaches investigating intersubjective encounters, such as Enactivism, Conversational 
Analysis and Infant Research, this dissertation has explored cooperation as an aspect of 
social participation that evolves within human interactions, but is also already grounded in 
infants’ interactional competencies. This comprehensive approach has provided much 
                                                
3Laura Galbusera is a TESIS Early Stage fellow at the University Clinic in 
Heidelberg. This chapter is the result of our intense collaboration during my secondment at 
the University Clinic in Heidelberg in 2013.	  
21 
needed insight into the importance of widening the concept of cooperation and its 
development, considering joint routines as multimodal contexts in everyday life where 
infants (but also adults) learn to understand, make sense of, and align with the other’s 
actions and affects, without relying on inferential processes. 
22 
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2. WE CAN WORK IT OUT: AN ENACTIVE ACCOUNT OF COOPERATION 
Abstract 
The past years have seen an increasing debate on cooperation and its unique human 
character. Philosophers and psychologists have proposed that cooperative activities are 
characterized by shared goals to which participants are committed through the ability to 
understand each other’s intentions. Despite its popularity, some serious issues arise with 
this approach to cooperation. First, one may challenge the assumption that high-level 
mental processes are necessary for engaging in acting cooperatively. If they are, then how 
do agents that do not possess such ability (preverbal children, or children with autism who 
are often claimed to be mind-blind) engage in cooperative exchanges, as the evidence 
suggests? Secondly, to define cooperation as the result of two decontextualized minds 
reading each other’s intentions may fail to fully acknowledge the complexity of situated, 
interactional dynamics and the interplay of variables such as the participants’ relational and 
personal history and experience. In this joint work mainstream accounts of cooperation are 
revisited, calling for an embodied approach that sees cooperation not only as an individual 
attitude towards the other, but also as a property of interaction processes. Integrating the 
ethnomethodology view of cooperation as an intrinsic element of the process of interacting, 
where “each party builds upon structure provided by others” (Goodwin, 2013, p. 17), with 
key features of enactivism (autonomy, interaction and sense-making), this work broadens 
the spectrum of cooperative activities, including some very basic ones that can take place 
before complex communicative abilities are achieved. The issue then is not whether one is 
able or not to read the other’s intentions, but what it takes to participate in joint action. 
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From this basic account, it should be possible to build up more complex forms of 
cooperation as needed. Addressing the study of cooperation in these terms may enhance our 
understanding of human social development, and foster knowledge of different ways of 
engaging with others, as in the case of autism. 
2.1. Introduction 
Despite its extensive exploration by philosophers and psychologists, a clear description and 
understanding of what makes an activity cooperative is still controversial. This is because 
cooperation is often described, by mainstream accounts, as depending on high-level social 
skills, and this, as Butterfill puts it, “already presupposes too much sophistication in the use 
of psychological concepts” (2012) to be applicable in the investigation of more basic forms 
of cooperation. Indeed, most of the empirical studies on children’s cooperation are based on 
inferential and mentalistic theoretical accounts, which may not be the most adequate 
framework to study how it emerges in typical and atypical developmental paths. The 
present work challenges these theoretical models and proposes to widen the exploration of 
what cooperation is, what kind of experiences may support someone’s cooperative 
participation in joint actions, and how this participation may develop over time. 
Implications of such a change in perspective for cooperation in infancy and in autism are 
advanced. 
Philosophical accounts of cooperation 
Current theories of joint action have attempted to describe cooperation as a phenomenon 
primarily based on cognitive abilities. These theories depict social encounters (and 
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cooperative actions) as encounters of minds, where participants have to infer each other’s 
beliefs and desires to understand and predict the other’s intentions and moves. Central to 
these theories is the concept of shared intentionality. Many philosophical theories propose 
that joint actions require the creation of shared (or collective, or joint) intentions4 (Gilbert, 
1989; Bratman, 1992, 1993; Tuomela, 1995; Searle, 1995). Sharing intentions is possible 
when partners make individual plans for achieving a common goal, and then formulate 
predictions upon the other's intention to achieve the same goal (Gilbert, 1989, 2000; 
Bratman, 1992; Tuomela, 1993, 2005; Pacherie, 2006). Shared intentions, according to 
Bratman, are defined as a set of interrelated individual intentional states. In shared 
activities, he claims, “each agent intends that the group perform the joint action in 
accordance with and because of meshing subplans of each participating agent's intention 
that the group so act” (1992, p. 333). According to this view, a joint activity is the result of 
a shared intention, and a shared intention is simply a pattern of “interlocking” plan-
intentions of the participants about which they have common knowledge. Essentially, for 
cognitivist philosophical approaches, partners engage in cooperative actions if they are able 
to infer each other's thoughts and plans, and combine them to build their co-actions in some 
shared way. 
As the interest in exploring joint intentionality and joint actions has grown, further 
theorization followed the original descriptions of cooperation. Building upon Bratman’s 
account, for example, Tummolini (2013) suggests that representing one’s own goal and 
                                                
4This work will not go into the debate about specific differences between shared or 
collective intentionality or other denominations. For an overview of analytic standpoints on 
the terms, see for instance Schweikard & Schmid, 2013.  
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those of others from a third-person observational perspective is also a necessary cognitive 
ability to collaborate, along with mind-reading. Thanks to this allocentric representation of 
goals (as he names it) individuals are endowed with both “an intention in favour of the joint 
action and one in favour of a joint mode of reasoning”, which enables them to coordinate in 
a joint action. Other researchers have attempted to formulate less cognitively demanding 
accounts of shared intentionality, yet still considering representing intentions at the very 
ground of any joint action. Sebanz, Bekkering and Knoblich (2006), for instance, proposed 
that a successful joint action “depends on the abilities (i) to share representations, (ii) to 
predict actions, and (iii) to integrate predicted effects of own and others’ actions” (2006, 
p.70). 
Because they presuppose the presence of high-level socio-cognitive capacities, 
standard accounts of cooperation hardly apply to those who do not possess propositional 
knowledge about others’ intentions, such as young children or animals, and some 
philosophers have already questioned this assumption. Tollefsen (2005), for instance, has 
argued that awareness of another’s intention may not depend on inferring it, but on the 
ability to track intentions-in-action. She argues that attending to each other’s actions 
provides participants with a shared perceptual space constructed through joint attention 
dynamics. In this shared space, intentions-in-action are perceptually overt and identifiable 
so that even young children without a “robust theory of mind” (p. 81) can theoretically 
engage in cooperative activities. Despite these developmental concerns, the author 
explicitly avoids addressing how this perspective can be effectively applied from very early 
in development, by saying that “[p]rior to the first year, young infants are like windowless 
monads” (p. 80), implying that they cannot yet interact. By stressing the importance of joint 
attention and social referencing mechanisms (as defined by Tomasello, 1995) for the 
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building up of a shared space, she neglects the possibility of earlier forms of cooperation, 
e.g. in infancy. Similarly concerned with understanding the role of joint action in 
development, Butterfill (2012) proposed to replace the concept of shared intentions with 
that of shared goals. Sharing a goal, in his view, only requires agents’ goal-directed actions 
to be coordinated, but does not imply knowledge. This move should make cooperation 
possible in early development. However, he also claims that possessing a shared goal 
requires representing goal-directed actions, and the way this is achieved by young children, 
in his proposal, is not completely clear. 
These arguments arguably reflect a general problem with the cooperation research 
reviewed so far: cooperation is framed in its full-blown, adult form and therefore it is 
difficult to see how those who do not have high socio-cognitive skills (including 
representing goal-directed actions) or experience could possibly cooperate. This is the main 
concern in the present paper. 
Cognitive developmental accounts of cooperation 
Defining what it is to cooperate from a developmental point of view is challenging. Recent 
developmental research in psychology has endorsed a cognitivist account of shared 
cooperative activities, suggesting that a major step in children’s social cognitive 
development occurs when, at around 12 to 14 months, children begin to engage with adults 
in cooperative activities involving an understanding of interdependent roles (Tomasello et 
al., 2005), and are generally motivated to help the other to accomplish her role if needed 
(Moll & Tomasello, 2007). Therefore, in order to cooperate, it seems that “children must be 
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able to represent, monitor, and regulate both their own and the partner's behavior relative to 
their relation to a single, common goal” (Brownell & Carriger, 1990, p. 1165).  
To empirically investigate early cooperative skills through abilities such as 
perspective taking and understanding of the other’s intentions and goals, most of the studies 
on young children have adopted specifically designed lab tasks involving role reversal or 
simultaneous coordination of movements (Brownell & Carriger, 1990; Warneken, Chen, & 
Tomasello, 2006; Warneken et al., 2012). In the majority of these studies, successfully 
performed joint tasks would set the age threshold for attributing cooperative abilities and 
instrumental helping to children. For example, Brownell et al. (2006) observed children at 
19, 23 and 27 months of age engaging in peer cooperative problem solving tasks. In these 
tasks, each child had to pull simultaneously or sequentially one handle of a wooden box to 
activate a musical toy mounted on the box. Activating the toy by coordinating each other’s 
timing and movements would lead to successful performance of the task. The researchers 
found that one-year-old children coordinated their actions more by coincidence than in a 
cooperative way, whereas older children appeared to be more actively cooperating towards 
a shared goal. They took these results to confirm their view that the ability to cooperate 
depends on “being able to represent and to share goals and intentions with a partner” (p. 
806), an ability that, according to the study, could only be seen over the second and third 
years of life.  
Another example is a study in which Warneken and Tomasello (2007) investigated 
instrumental helping and cooperation in 14-months-olds children. Instrumental helping was 
defined as providing help to people in completing a task, e.g. to pick up an out-of-reach 
object, whereas cooperation was measured through a series of cooperative tasks to be 
resolved jointly, such as retrieving an object from a vertically movable cylinder embedded 
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in a platform. Their results showed that at 14 months children reliably helped a partner who 
could not achieve a goal, but cooperated successfully only in tasks demanding low 
coordination. The authors concluded that “Helping might be easier for children than 
cooperating because it requires the understanding of what another individual intends to do 
(…), whereas cooperation requires the ability to form a shared goal and to mesh plans of 
action toward that goal” (ibid. p. 291). In other words, helping would only require reading 
another’s intention, whereas cooperation would also require one’s own and the other’s 
intentions to be co-dependent and converge. 
In sum, developmental research has attempted to define the beginning of 
cooperation by setting tasks based on similar premises, thus designing practical tasks that 
need not only inferring but also mobilising well-formed intentions to be completed. These 
premises derive from the mainstream philosophical accounts of cooperative actions, which 
propose that engaging in a cooperative action requires possessing mind-reading abilities, 
and abilities to align one’s own intentions and beliefs with the other’s, although milder, less 
cognitively weighted positions have also been proposed. In the next section some pitfalls of 
current theoretical and methodological approaches are discussed. 
Methodological and theoretical issues with standard approaches 
To put shared intentionality at the very basis of shared cooperative action raises the 
question of how humans get to know others' intentions and goals. On the standard accounts, 
this is done by use of a theory of mind or a simulation mechanism, which is “any cognitive 
system … that predicts or explains the behaviour of another agent by postulating that 
unobservable inner states particular to the cognitive perspective of that agent causally 
31 
modulate that agent’s behaviour” (Penn & Povinelli, 2008, p. 394). This cognitive system is 
often thought to be supported by the so-called social brain (Frith & Frith, 2003; Frith 2007).  
If intentions are hidden, are joint intentions hidden too? Within mindreading 
approaches, social understanding requires, among other things, being able to get access to 
another’s intentions, or more in general, contents of the mind. The “problem” of 
understanding others’ minds is based on the premise that intentions are hidden and private, 
that is, that others’ intentions (like thoughts, ideas, beliefs) need to be inferred through 
complex representational operations (Apperly, 2011). Now, how are such intentions 
shared? On standard representationalist accounts, this is often proposed to happen through 
some forms of mental alignment, for instance by simultaneous mirror system activation 
(Gallese, 2003; Pacherie, 2006; Sebanz et al., 2006). In this view, everyone has her own 
understanding of others’ intentions to jointly perform an action, but how these 
understandings become shared remains unclear. For example, Knoblich and Sebanz (2008) 
have attempted to explain how people can form intentions to act together in terms of three 
steps. First, they need to be able to derive the other person’s intentions behind her object-
directed actions or actions directed to her partner. Then, actors need to be able to keep 
knowledge of these intentions separate from their own intentions. Eventually, “There needs 
to be an intentional structure that allows an actor to relate his/her own intention and the 
other's intention to an intention that drives the joint activity” (2008, p. 2025). Although it 
may seem very basic, this definition is still quite cognitively demanding, and does not solve 
the main problem of how an “intentional structure” works. Is it individual or shared, 
implicitly or explicitly created?  
There seems to be a gap here in the form of an empty space in between people: 
these approaches have explained shared intentionality from an observer’s perspective, but 
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not from a participant’s one. This is in line with criticisms of the standard approach to 
social cognition (e.g. Gallagher, 2001; Leudar & Costall 2009) and with views on 
interpersonal alignment as primarily based on embodied engagement (Macmurray, 
1991Bråten, 2003; Reddy & Morris, 2004; De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007; Fuchs & De 
Jaegher, 2009). Shotter nicely summarised these alternative positions: “Motives, intentions, 
sentiments are (...) directly perceived by those directly involved in [a joint action] as first 
person actors and second person recipients in that activity. Only third person observers 
have to make inferences” (Shotter, 1983, p. 39). 
Another consideration is whether we need to know that we are cooperating in order 
to be able to cooperate. Often, cooperation is presupposed as something we set out to do, so 
that actions are either clearly cooperative or not – a separate and identifiable type of action 
altogether. This may indeed sometimes be the case, for example when two people meet to 
perform a certain shared task, like bathing a very agitated dog. But taking this idea as the 
starting point for understanding cooperation presupposes that we already know what it is, 
and so there is no need to define the elements out of which it could arise. It precludes, for 
example, the possibility that cooperation arises without there being a predefined intention 
or motive to cooperate, while this may be key to understanding how people get to cooperate 
in the first place. Shared goals may emerge during the course of an interaction, and so 
participants can ‘roll into’ cooperation without having previous awareness of it. For 
instance, making space for someone who enters a crowded bus is achieved by the new and 
old passengers together, each adjusting movements and postures. Here, a common goal 
emerges out of the interaction and in the context of a small space to be shared as smoothly 
as possible. Understanding this emergent kind of phenomenon will give us further insights 
into what cooperation is and how it works.  
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Where is development? To what extent cooperative actions play a role in human 
development if cooperation is conceived as heavily relying on high cognitive skills and a 
long experience with social interactions? As Butterfill has written: 
If the leading account were the whole truth about joint action, engaging in joint 
action would presuppose, and therefore not explain, much of the development of 
reasoning about others’ mental states. (...) We need a further account of joint action, 
one that is compatible with the premise that joint action plays a role in explaining 
how humans develop abilities to think about minds (2012, p. 24). 
Furthermore, developmental research on cooperation is based on a rather restricted 
pool of tasks, which are designed to assess cooperative problem-solving and related 
abilities like role reversal, perspective-taking and joint attention. These do not necessarily 
cover the whole range of possible cooperative interactions in a child’s life, as there are 
many situations (some of which are discussed below) in which a clear, explicit division of 
roles and statement of goals is not needed. Furthermore, the structure of these tasks implies 
a “pass or fail” evaluation and seems therefore more appropriate to detect when cooperative 
skills are already present, rather than telling us how they emerge or develop in time (Thelen 
& Smith, 1994).  
Which view on cooperation one adopts is likely to have rather serious consequences 
when studying cooperative exchanges in both typical and atypical development. This is, for 
example, the case with research on cooperation in autism. Studies on cooperation in autism 
that are based on mind-reading and perspective-taking abilities5 find that children with 
                                                
5Mainstream accounts of autism have long proposed that people with autism have 
difficulties in mind-reading (Baron-Cohen, 1989; Dinishak & Akhtar, 2013), joint attention 
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autism are less successful than children with developmental delay (Sally & Hill, 2006; 
Liebal et al. 2007;). However, this does not mean that they are completely incapable. For 
instance they seem to be able to help an adult as needed (Liebal et al., 2007), particularly 
when they understand the other person’s goals toward an object (Aldridge et al. 2000; 
Carpenter et al. 2001). Liebal and colleagues explained these findings in terms of a specific 
impaired understanding of the partner’s role within the cooperative task that would not 
apply when the situation does not require knowledge of and agreement on each partner’s 
role. Thus, it may be that children with autism can succeed in cooperative tasks, if they do 
not entail an explicit understanding and prior agreement on each partner’s role. Similarly, if 
they are given appropriate interactive support, e.g. if they are helped with being aware of 
the other person in the interaction, they can cooperate in a dual-control technology task 
(Holt & Yuill, 2014).  
In conclusion, to study cooperation as it develops and in conditions implying 
impairments in social skills we need to investigate it at a more basic level than has been 
done so far. The next section discusses what is at stake for individuals participating in 
cooperative interactions as emerging processes. For doing this, the concepts and research 
tools of enaction are used, a specific approach to cognition within the embodiment 
movement in cognitive science (Varela et al., 1991; Thompson, 2007; Di Paolo et al., 
2010).  
                                                                                                                                               
(Loveland and Landry, 1986), or impairments in turn-taking skills (McEvoy et al., 1993), 
although these findings are not uncontroversial, and even primary proponents recognise that 
there is always a number of participants who do pass the tests (Happé 1995; but see also 
Boucher 1989, 1996, 2012; Gernsbacher 2008).  
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2.2. The enactive perspective on sense-making and social interactions 
Enaction is a non-reductive naturalistic approach that proposes a deep continuity between 
living and cognitive processes. It is a scientific program that explores several phases along 
this life-mind continuum, based on six mutually supporting, operational concepts: 
autonomy, sense-making, embodiment, emergence, experience, and participatory sense-
making (Varela, et al. 1991; Thompson, 2005, 2007; De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007; Di 
Paolo et al., 2010). Here, two of its main concepts are introduced first: sense-making — the 
enactive notion of cognition in general; and participatory sense-making — enactive social 
cognition. In section 3, these ideas are applied to reframe the concept of cooperation.  
Sense-making 
For enaction, “the mind is seen not as inhering in the individual, but as emerging, 
existing dynamically in the relationship between organisms and their surroundings 
(including other agents)” (McGann et al., 2013). Or, as Merleau-Ponty already put it: 
The world is inseparable from the subject, but from a subject which is nothing but a 
project of the world, and the subject is inseparable from the world, but from a world 
which the subject itself projects (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 430). 
In this view, the paradigmatic cases of cognisers are living organisms (Varela, 1997; 
Thompson, 2007). One of their crucial properties is their constitutive and interactive 
autonomy, which is defined as a network of dynamical processes (metabolic, immune, 
neural, sensorimotor, etc.) that actively generates and sustains an identity under precarious 
conditions (Di Paolo, 2005). An autonomous system constantly produces itself physically, 
and regulates its interactions with the world to satisfy the needs created by its precarious 
condition (Di Paolo, 2005). The living organism spontaneously generates its own goals and 
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responds to the environment (McGann, 2007), in accordance with its self-organisation. The 
cogniser is therefore always situated in a world that is significant for it, based on this 
perspective based on need. Its world is not pre-given but largely enacted, i.e. shaped as part 
of its autonomous activity. For the enactive approach, cognition is embodied, meaning that 
a cogniser’s activity depends non-trivially on the body. The body is more than just 
anatomical or physiological structures and sensorimotor strategies; it is the precarious 
combination of various interrelated self-sustaining identities (organic, cognitive, social), 
each interacting with the world in terms of the consequences for its own viability (Di Paolo, 
2005).  
These ideas together ground the enactive characterization of cognition as sense-
making: an individual’s adaptive regulation of its states and interactions with the world, 
with respect to the implications for the continuation of its own autonomous identity. The 
concept of sense-making describes the relation between an autonomous agent and the world 
of significance it enacts. It therefore does not conceive of cognitive processes as 
representational and avoids the known problems of cognitivism. Organisms do not 
passively receive information from their environments, which they then translate into 
internal representations whose significant value is to be added later. Natural cognitive 
systems participate in sense-making as a relational and affect-laden process grounded in 
biological organisation (Jonas, 1966; Varela, 1991, 1997; Weber & Varela, 2002; Di Paolo, 
2005; Thompson, 2007). Sense-making, thus, is valued or concerned acting and interacting, 
leaving no gap between affect and cognition — they are one in the relation of significance 
between the individual and world. 
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Participatory sense-making  
Having briefly explained what enactive cognition is, and sense-makers’ inherently 
meaningful perspective on and interactions with the world, let us now take a closer look at 
social encounters, the second main element in the enactive sketch of cooperation. The 
enactive approach considers sociality in its broadest form, namely as intersubjectivity, or 
the meaningful engagement between subjects (Reddy, 2008), in which three aspects are 
crucial: engagement, meaning, and subject. Meaning and subjectivity have been explained 
above in terms of sense-making, namely as the way living (cognising) systems always 
meaningfully engage with their environment, because they are self-organising and self-
maintaining. In this section, the focus is turned on engagement between such concerned 
subjects.  
Crucial to the enactive approach is the focus on social interaction processes, which 
are complex phenomena involving different dimensions of verbal and nonverbal behaviour, 
varying contexts, numbers of participants and technological mediation. They impose strict 
timing demands, involve reciprocal activity, exhibit a mixture of discrete and continuous 
events at different timescales, and are often robust against external disruptions. Essential to 
interaction is that it involves engagement between agents. Engagement (Reddy & Morris, 
2004; Reddy, 2008) captures the qualitative aspect of social interactions once they start to 
‘take over’ and acquire a momentum of their own. It also reflects the way this experience is 
described in everyday language (e.g. “being in sync with someone”). Experientially, 
engagement is the fluctuating feelings of connectedness with one another, including that of 
being in the flow of an interaction.  
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In order to capture this taking-over aspect of engagement, enaction defines social 
interaction in terms of the autonomy (as defined above) of the interaction process and that 
of the individuals involved, as  
a co-regulated coupling between at least two autonomous agents, where: (i) the co-
regulation and the coupling mutually affect each other, constituting an autonomous 
self-sustaining organisation in the domain of relational dynamics and (ii) the 
autonomy of the agents involved is not destroyed (although its scope can be 
augmented or reduced) (De Jaegher et al., 2010, p. 442-443).  
Apart from each agent involved in such a coupling contributing to its co-regulation, the 
interaction process itself also self-organises and self-maintains. To illustrate this, think of 
how sometimes, when you encounter someone coming from the other direction in a narrow 
corridor, you end up in front of each other, then each step aside, moving to the same side at 
the same time, preventing both of you from continuing on your way. This simple example 
shows how the interaction process can become autonomous or ‘take on a life of its own’. At 
the same time, the interactors also maintain their autonomy as participants. This is a 
necessary condition for calling an interaction social, because if one of the participants loses 
their autonomy, for the other it would be like interacting with an object or a tool, and thus 
not a social interaction anymore (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007).  
Social interactions are sustained by processes of embodied coordination, including 
its breakdowns and repairs (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007; Di Paolo & De Jaegher, 2012). 
Coordination does not necessarily require cognitively complicated skill. Analyses of social 
interactions and conversations in social science show that participants can unconsciously 
coordinate their movements and utterances, and this is already the case in mother-infant 
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interactions (Condon & Sander, 1974; Stern, 1977/2002; Condon, 1979; Scollon, 1981; 
Davis, 1982; Tronick & Cohn, 1989; Kendon 1990; Grammer et al., 1998; Malloch, 1999; 
Jaffe et al., 2001; Issartel et al., 2007; Malloch & Trevarthen, 2009). With the concept of 
coordination and other dynamical systems tools, interaction dynamics can be measured (see 
e.g. Kelso, 2009). Moreover, they can be related to neural activity (see e.g. Lindenberger et 
al., 2009; Dumas et al., 2010, 2012; Cui et al., 2012; Di Paolo & De Jaegher, 2012; 
Konvalinka & Roepstorff, 2012; Schilbach et al., in press). 
Based on this definition of social interaction, and the notions of sense-making and 
coordination, social understanding can now be characterised as participatory sense-making: 
If, as indicated above, we make sense of the world by moving around in and with it, and we 
coordinate our movements with others when interacting with them, this means that we can 
coordinate our sense-making activities. That is, we literally participate in each other’s 
sense-making activities. Thus, on the enactive account, social understanding is understood 
as the generation and transformation of meaning together in interaction (De Jaegher & Di 
Paolo, 2007; De Jaegher, 2009; Fuchs & De Jaegher, 2009). Participants co-create the 
interactive situation, but also the interaction process as such influences the sense-making 
that takes place. If a social interaction is as characterised, then people can act together, also 
for no apparent end or purpose of their own, or even against their individual ends (e.g. the 
corridor encounter). Even without a shared intention to start with or when entered into 
against their will by the participants, interacting can change or affect one’s ends or 
purposes.  
This has an interesting consequence for understanding intentions, namely they are 
truly generated and transformed interactionally, and interacting with each other opens up 
new domains of sense-making that individuals would not have on our own. This contrasts 
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with the way intentions are conceived in cognitivist approaches to cooperation, as 
introduced above, namely as hidden, and only shareable by high-level cognitive 
mechanisms. On the account presented in this study, intentions do not first arise or are first 
made individually, but they emerge as the interaction goes on (Di Paolo, under review). 
Therefore, intentions are visible and understandable by each participant, also in cooperative 
interactions, as they are contextualized and stem from that specific ongoing interaction. 
This makes understanding and aligning with the other’s intentions un-mysterious: it 
happens in doing things together, which is moving together, since movements are already 
and always imbued with meaning for sense-makers (Johnson, 2007; Sheets-Johnstone, 
2011; Merritt, 2013). On the basis of this, it is possible to see how intentions can evolve in 
their jointness, meanings and specificity for those involved throughout interaction, 
including cooperative ones.  
Cooperation as a process 
Starting from the most rudimentary or minimal form of cooperation may be possible to 
make it understandable from a developmental point of view. With the enactive concepts of 
sense-making and participatory sense-making in hand, let us now look again at cooperation, 
starting from its basic definition as “i) acting or working together and ii) a common or the 
same end or purpose” (Tuomela, 2000, p. 3).  
Considering social interactions as already cooperative in a basic sense, it is possible 
to integrate it with a developmentally-grounded definition by Hubley and Trevarthen, 
proposing that 
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cooperation means that each of the subjects is taking account of the other's interests 
and objectives in some relation to the extrapersonal context, and is acting to 
complement the other's response” (1979, p. 58). 
In line with what has been proposed so far, “taking account of the other’s interests and 
objectives” does not need inferences, but may happen through embodied interactions that 
are meaningful in the given situation and in the interactional history. These actions are 
complementary in that they fit each other in some form. This is not only the case for 
positive cooperation but also for situations in which individuals argue and disagree about 
something, where some complementarity is still needed in order for the disagreement even 
to be played out. This means that there are different forms, layers, and aspects of 
cooperation: embodied, in time, in space, in topic, imitative or complementary, etc. 
Interacting guarantees that some basic cooperative layer is present (e.g. in the corridor 
situation, individuals cooperate to stop cooperating). Also, since sense-making always 
involves affect, this view of cooperation becomes less intellectualistic and begins to 
investigate how affective processes may be involved in cooperation. Then, the challenge is 
to investigate what further levels of cooperation are present in a specific interaction or 
situation, over and above the basic interaction process. This can involve different, 
increasingly more complex levels of sense-making.  
Like the enactive approach, interactionist approaches such as ethnomethodology 
and conversation analysis have also based their empirical programme on a theory of social 
interaction as a dynamical constructions and a view of others’ intentions as mutually 
accessible and accountable for. Ethnomethodology was originally developed by Garfinkel 
to “discover the methods that persons use in their everyday life (...) in constructing social 
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reality” (Psathas, 1968, p.509), and thus entails the study of how this reality is constructed, 
produced and organized in social encounters. Derived from phenomenology, it shares with 
it an interest in exploring the participants’ embodied experience of being engaged in 
mundane interactions; the latter are seen as phenomena in their own right, yet situated in 
specific cultural contexts and practices (see, for instance, the work of Schütz, 1967/1932). 
Inspired by ethnomethodology and by Goffman’s work on the interaction order (1983), 
Conversation Analysis (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jeffersons, 1974; Sacks, 1992; Schegloff, 
2007) investigates the systematic features of naturally occurring conversations. In a large 
body of work now spanning over five decades, it has revealed the fine, moment-by-moment 
coordination of speakers, and the sequential structuring that enable the orderly participation 
of different interactors across turns-at-talk and within complex activities. Central in this 
approach is a view of human communication as multimodal, where different but integrated 
communicative resources (verbal and non-verbal) contribute to establishing the 
interactional context, anticipating, co-constructing, and if necessary repairing the emergent 
definition of what is going on (Kendon, 1990; Streeck, et al., 2011; Tulbert & Goodwin, 
2011). Thus, interactions are always cooperative, inasmuch as participants orient to, 
monitor and support the interlocutors’ understanding and act so as to enable their 
successive moves (Goodwin, 1995; 2013).  
Intentions and goals are not searched before or behind the communicative action as 
its ‘cause’, but are manifest in speakers’ behaviour, shaped and adjusted as the interaction 
unfolds. Within this framework, and in convergence with enactivism, cooperating is 
possible even for those - like young children - who do not possess a robust capacity to 
‘read’ others’ intentions or plans, but can nevertheless participate in joint, situated 
interactions (Forrester, 2008; Mehus, 2011; Lerner et al., 2011).  
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Cooperation in infancy 
What are the implications of this theoretical shift for understanding cooperation in infancy? 
Since infants cannot remain alive alone, they need others to help them with nourishing, 
shelter, hygiene, and social interaction. In line with what has been suggested so far, infants 
contribute actively to this caring, because they are themselves sense-makers, generating and 
maintaining their own living identity, and also, quite possibly, already their social identity 
(Stern, 1985; Delafield-Butt & Gangopadhyay, 2013).  
Hubley (1983) defined cooperation in infancy as the joint management of objects, 
actions or ideas to fulfil a purpose that two interactors share. She identified some minimum 
requirements for cooperative actions in infancy, which are 1) a shared plan of action within 
mutual orientation, with the infant attending to and acting with reference to the partner’s 
indicated purposes; 2) active contributions to a single coordinated event, which, on the 
infant’s part, is seen as a clearly identifiable and oriented action to influence the behaviour 
of the partner and then mesh with the partner’s action to complete a shared purpose; 3) 
willing participation. On the one hand, such a definition seems fitting with the infant’s 
limited communicative resources as it does not imply that the partners should verbally 
agree on a shared plan or goal. However, it presupposes that some shared plan has been 
somehow established, and requires that each partner understands the interest or purposes of 
the other regarding the shared action. As already argued, such an explicit agreement may 
not be required in all forms of cooperative interactions.  
Mary Catherine Bateson (1979) explored the dynamics of early dialogues, so called 
‘proto-conversations’, between mothers and infants, as contexts for learning how to 
participate and sustain joint performances, describing the  
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‘Exquisite ritual courtesy’ and precise cooperation of a two-month-old infant with 
the mother by expressive face and body movements, and by delicately modulated 
vocal sounds, and (she) concluded that the behaviours of both baby and adult 
revealed innate foundations of language (Trevarthen, 2013, p. 7). 
On the same line of Bateson’s research, the fundamental contribution of past developmental 
research has been to reveal how early communicative interactions are created out of 
contributions of both the infant and the caregiver (Hubley & Trevarthen, 1979; Trevarthen, 
1979). Bruner (1977) recognised shared reference and role-taking as cooperative features in 
communicative interactions involving giving and receiving objects before one year of age. 
More recent observations have demonstrated how, since very early in life, infants adjust 
and facilitate actions directed to them, especially in daily routines such as when the 
caregivers pick them up, change their nappy, or play a social game with them (Service, 
1984; Nomikou & Rohlfing, 2012; Reddy et al., 2012; Rączaszek-Leonardi, et al., 2013; 
Fantasia et al., 2014). In a perspective that considers social interactions as basic forms of 
cooperation by participating in shared, meaningful interactions, infants practice their ability 
to make sense of and coordinate with the caregiver’s action, becoming increasingly skilled 
in their social participation.  
The importance of interpersonal coordination for participating and making sense 
with the other in interaction was already stressed by research on neonatal imitation. 
Researchers discovered that early forms of imitation were grounded in the precise 
coordination of timing and movements, playing an essential role in the building up of early 
communicative modalities (Nagy, 2011; Trevarthen, 2015), such as turn-taking.  
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One of the criticisms addressed to existing studies was that they measured children's 
cooperative ability when they successfully performed a joint pre-fixed task, regarding 
cooperation as a cognitive skill that can be switched on and off means neglecting the 
importance of learning processes that sprout from and within cooperative interactions. In 
contrast, in a here-and-now perspective the process of cooperating enables children to build 
up their actions moment by moment through a sequence of relational adjustments and (dis-) 
engagements towards a joint goal. Thanks to its structuring and structured nature, 
cooperation may be seen as a framework in which development occurs and at the same time 
as a mode of being with others learnt during development. If what was proposed so far is 
taken seriously – that any interaction requires some basic cooperation, followed, in some 
cases, by a process of co-negotiation towards a more or less explicit goal that matters to 
those who are involved in that process – then it also could be possible to explain how this 
process develops. Namely, exploring how participating in goal-directed joint actions 
supports and shapes infants’ development. 
Cooperation in autism 
A different theoretical perspective may also open up new possibilities for investigating 
cooperation in autism. As reported above, empirical findings suggest that some children 
with autism (at different chronological ages) perform poorly in high-level cooperative tasks 
and in other correlated abilities, such as joint attention, imitation, perspective taking, and 
role-reversal (see, for instance, Colombi et al., 2009). Yet, performing “poorly” does not 
mean that the capacity is absent, and indeed some children with Autistic Spectrum 
Condition (ASC) do pass the cooperative tasks. This result is not consistent with the 
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theoretical premises informing the design of the tests and the difficulties of children with 
autism, classically understood. One way to explain this (controversial) evidence may lie in 
changing the premises, instead of post hoc adjustments to the interpretation. 
Studies of the verbal production of children with autism that do not start from a 
deficit but try to understand the children's spontaneous interactional behaviour, can help to 
illustrate and support this shift of perspective. Conversation analysis studies, for example, 
allow us to observe how even echolalic productions (the repetition of utterances with no 
apparent relation to prior talk from other speakers), often seen in children with autism, are 
in fact responsive moves (Loca & Wootton, 1995; Wootton, 1999; Stribling et al. 
2005/2006; Sterponi & Shankey, 2014). The repetition of available utterances helps 
children to stay in the conversation despite their difficulty with improvising a newly 
designed turn. Sometimes these stereotypical contributions can take the form of questions 
and feed the progression of an interaction, supporting the child’s continued participation in 
a social exchange (Sterponi & Fasulo, 2007).  
Dickerson et al. (2007) have also shown that observing what children actually do 
reveals capacities for cooperation that cannot emerge in pre-defined tasks, for sometimes 
the ways in which children find solutions for their difficulties are not incorporated into the 
tasks. They investigated classroom interactions between two autistic children and their 
tutors. The children were asked to answer questions, using answer-cards. During the 
session, each of the children tapped the answer-cards, an action which at first sight seemed 
meaningless. However, using conversation analysis, Dickerson and colleagues could show 
that the children tapped on the cards just before they started answering, and sometimes 
continuing into their answering. This seems to indicate that the tapping is a way of 
engaging and of “projecting a relevant forthcoming response on the part of the child” 
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(Dickerson et al., 2007, p. 297). In other words, the children found means to signal their 
ongoing engagement when the timing of their verbal production was delayed, thus 
cooperating to the maintenance of the interactive plane.  
Using fine-grained observational methods, the actions of all participants can be 
studied and analysed in interaction, making it possible to pick up the forms of cooperation 
that infants and people with autism are capable of (see also Stribling et al., 2009). These 
examples demonstrate how the use of non-verbal and non-vocal resources for building up a 
co-participatory model of how the child and teachers work together becomes possible 
thanks to transcripts of the interactions. In this way, not only the participants’ talk, but also 
a number of non-verbal activities that are salient for the interaction are acknowledged. 
These results fit well with the Vygotskian idea that collaborative work leads to learning 
(Vygotsky, 1978; see also Goodwin, 2013). Furthermore, these studies suggest that ways to 
observe cooperative interactions in autism exist, if only autism and interaction are 
considered from a different perspective. During everyday interactions at home or school, in 
the car or at the park, children with autism are involved in many simpler, not-always-
explicit cooperative exchanges. Not only are the children part of these exchanges, but they 
also grow into them; namely, they learn to be active partners out of everyday cooperative 
interaction, just like every other child does. This is not to say that there are no difficulties or 
differences, but social understanding in autism may be more fruitfully studied from the 
basic and positive perspective put forward here.  
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2.3. Discussion 
In summary, the perspective shift we propose has implications for understanding typical 
development as well as autism. Firstly, it supports a developmental stance on cooperation 
in that it explores how we become cooperative interaction partners in the first place. If 
high-order mental skills (or a great deal of ‘social experience’) are assumed to be 
prerequisite for cooperating, it would not be possible to see how infants can grow into 
social interactions and gradually learn to engage with the social world around them, but 
rather wait until much of the development has already happened. However, proposing that 
cooperation is an aspect of interacting and understanding each other, it does become 
possible to investigate how it emerges and is learnt in early interactions. In this perspective, 
cooperation in infancy is a product of development, as well as a process in which 
development occurs.  
An interesting aspect to consider regarding development is how to conceive of 
cooperation in asymmetrical interactions. Infants seem to be able to cooperatively 
coordinate with caregivers from very early on (see e.g. Reddy et al., 2013; Fantasia et al. 
2014), but they may not do it with peers until later on, as suggested by some research 
(Warneken & Tomasello, 2006, 2007). From an enactive point of view, it is not surprising 
that infants are better able to cooperate with a caregiver than with a peer, since the presence 
of someone with more interactive experience makes the overall interaction more effective. 
This is related to Vygotsky’s notion of the zone of proximal development, where it is 
possible to scaffold someone in interaction to be jointly more capable of activities they 
cannot yet do alone (1978). What is needed for an interaction to be cooperative if the 
relation is asymmetric? If we think of a pick-up situation, we know that the adult is doing 
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the major part by actually holding the infant and lifting her up. Yet, infants are not 
passively waiting for it to happen. They make specific preparatory body adjustments that 
facilitate the mother’s movements, and thus, the pick-up sequence (Service, 1984; Reddy et 
al, 2012). At the same time, when the adult fails to complete the expected pick-up 
sequence, infants seem to stop being cooperative by dropping their body tension and 
participation (Fantasia et al, forthcoming). In this case, although the mother has the main 
role in making the pick-up sequence effective, the infant’s role is essential in its being 
clearly oriented towards the joint achievement of the interaction. Obviously, asymmetry 
may or may not play a strong role depending on the task.  
As a second point, if we are to understand autism in general, and specifically people 
with autism’s capacity to cooperate (which is firstly a particular form of social interaction) 
the change of perspective proposed here may also be helpful. How? forsaking a typical-
development perspective and, as Petra Björne and other authors have already suggested, 
paying more attention to what people with ASC can do and the way they describe their own 
experiences (Björne, 2007; Robledo et al., 2012; De Jaegher, 2013; Donnellan et al., 2013). 
As shown by the studies on autism presented in the previous section, considering actions in 
their interactional context and in their significance for all participants, it becomes possible 
to understand the emergence of cooperation also in the interactions of and with people with 
autism. Exploring cooperation in children with autism from an observer or third-person 
perspective not only fails to take into account the child’s experience of cooperating as an 
engaged partner; it also cuts out how the other person is feeling or experiencing the child as 
a partner. In cases like autism, in which social interactions run a different course, in which 
jointly attending to an object may not be at the core of the interaction, approaching 
cooperation from a second person perspective can make all the difference.  
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This work thus suggests that future studies on cooperation and autism should 
include more ecological observations and parental reports. This involves: finely studying 
the interaction (e.g. through ethnomethodology or conversation analysis), taking into 
account the context or the environment (using, for instance, parental reports or ecological 
observations), and studying what is at stake for the individuals involved (i.e. asking how 
they make sense in and of the interaction).  
2.4. Conclusions 
The present work aimed to show that it is possible to encompass a wider range of 
cooperative interactions, not only those in which interactors explicitly agree upon and set 
rules and roles for a specific shared task to be performed. This is not to neglect that in some 
particular scenarios participants do need to make efforts to make sense of the other’s 
intentions, and indeed goals need to be set out and agreed beforehand. Only, this is not 
always the case, as cooperation is a multi-layered process that may take different forms. In 
this perspective, the authors share Tollefsen’s view that intentions-in-action can emerge out 
of ongoing interaction (Tollefsen & Dale, 2012), with the minimum requirement that 
interactors share an interactional space. Cooperation is a form of participating in each 
other’s sense-making, in which individuals may form a goal or purpose together while 
interacting. It is not a skill that can be lacked but rather a way of being with others that is 
possible to learn. Learning to cooperate then becomes understandable as an important 
aspect of typical and atypical development. For this reason, future developmental research 
on cooperation (and social cognition in general) could benefit from more ecological 
observational methods and less adult-centric approaches (Donaldson, 1978). As the adult’s 
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way of cooperating is an already fully-blossomed one, one in which the picture is complete 
(and intentions can be easily inferred if needed), we need instead to observe infants and 
their daily living and discover the basic, emerging ways in which cooperation develops. 
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3. CHANGING THE GAME: EXPLORING INFANTS’ PARTICIPATION IN 
EARLY PLAY ROUTINES 
Abstract 
Play has proved to have a central role in children’s development, most notably in rule 
learning (Piaget, 1965; Sutton-Smith, 1979) and negotiation of roles and goals (Garvey, 
1974; Bruner et al., 1976). Yet very little research has been done on early play. The present 
study focuses on early social games, i.e. vocal-kinetic play routines that mothers use to 
interact with infants from very early on. We explored 3-month-old infants and their mothers 
performing a routine game first in the usual way, then in two violated conditions: without 
gestures and without sound. The aim of the study was to investigate infants’ participation 
and expectations in the game and whether this participation is affected by changes in the 
multimodal format of the game. Infants’ facial expressions, gaze and body movements were 
coded to measure levels of engagement and affective state across the three conditions. 
Results showed a significant decrease in Limbs Movements and expressions of Positive 
Affect, and an increase in Gaze Away and in Stunned Expression when the game structure 
was violated. These results indicate that the violated game conditions were experienced as 
less engaging, either because of an unexpected break in the established joint routine, or 
simply because they were weaker versions of the same game. Overall, our results suggest 
that structured, multimodal play routines may constitute interactional contexts that only 
work as integrated units of auditory and motor resources, representing early communicative 
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contexts which prepare the ground for later, more complex multimodal interactions, such as 
verbal exchanges. 
3.1. Introduction 
The present study explores infants’ participation in play routines with their mother, through 
observing their response to un-expected alterations of a familiar social game. Play has been 
widely explored for its central role in children’s development, most notably in rule learning 
and negotiation of tasks, roles and goals (Piaget, 1951, 1965; Bruner et al., 1976; Vygotsky, 
1978; Sutton-Smith, 1979; Camaioni & Laicardi, 1985). Through play, children learn how 
to deal with others’ expectations and feelings and, even more, they learn about their own 
feelings, desires and goals when confronted with those of the others (Blurton-Jones, 1967; 
Coleman, 1967). Playing together is not merely the sum of single responses to the partner’s 
play, but rather a creative process emerging from the interactional dynamics between 
different individuals in a specific cultural context (Fogel 1993). To be engaged in a social 
game is thus - at the same time - a developmental goal and an instrument through which 
development occurs, and an ideal place to investigate social interactions. 
Although it is generally agreed in developmental research that children’s social play 
has intrinsic co-operative qualities, the same has not been demonstrated for infants' play. 
Indeed, relatively little research has been done on the formats and structures of early 
mother-infant multimodal games, and how infants participate in them. 
Previous studies have explored the mother-infant’s mutual building up of “free” 
play interactions around 3 months of age (Stern, 1974; Trevarthen, 1988) and spontaneous 
peekaboo play episodes in the context of language acquisition from around 5 months 
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(Bruner & Sherwood, 1976; Ratner & Bruner, 1977). Mother-infant free play has been also 
described in terms of negotiation of interactional boundaries and points of transition (Stern, 
1974), the different ways of alternating participation (turn-taking) and the manners in 
which a play sequence may be built up through a considerable spatio-temporal structuring 
(Garvey, 1974). Besides these pioneering studies, very little research has been done on 
structured game routines in infancy, like early nursery rhymes or vocal-kinetic 
combinations of gestures and songs (Mehus, 2011). Since these routines are well known to 
be played by mothers from very early on, they are also part of the infant’s daily experience 
of participating in structured, meaningful interactions, such as being fed or dressed, or play 
a familiar game. These routines have proved to help infants to coordinate with the adult’s 
actions (Hubley, 1983; Trevarthen, 1977) and to become skilled cooperative agents as they 
participate in them (Lerner et al., 2011; Raczaszek-Leonardi et al., 2013). Routines, as they 
are familiar and predictable, also orient the infant’s capacity to anticipate the other’s action 
and create expectations on the other’s behaviour (Ambrosini et al., 2013; Reddy, et al., 
2013).  
Infants’ expectations have been an area of considerable investigation in 
developmental research (Spelke, 1985; Baillargeon, 1994). One way to explore them is by 
introducing changes in a familiar situation, that is, by violating them. Studies using this 
method have typically focused on the infant’s reaction to maternal breach in engagement, 
or withdrawal from the ongoing interaction. Research showed that at around 3 months of 
age infants react by frowning and gazing away from an adult who abruptly stopped 
interacting with them (Lamb et al., 1987; Tronick & Cohn, 1989). At around 4 to 5 months 
infants protest (crying more loudly) and orient away when an adult intentionally fails to 
soothe them by picking up, letting the infants’ expectations unmet (Lamb & Malkin, 1986); 
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around 9 months infants can detect game interruptions by their playing partner, increasing 
their vocalisations to call her back in the game (Ross & Lollis, 1987), and at 10 months 
they increase their gaze to an adult’s face whose action was blocking the infant’s play with 
a toy (Phillips et al., 1992). These studies support the idea that infants are sensitive to 
alterations of the adult’s usual behaviour from very early on6.  
This study differs from previous research as it looks at infants’ reaction to violations 
of the multimodal format of a familiar play routine, by a partner that is still affectively 
engaged with them. Notwithstanding, it shares the same conceptual grounding of previous 
research: observing the infants’ participation in a familiar situation and the way it changes 
in response to unexpected behaviours, in order to learn more about how infants take part in, 
and make sense of early social interactions. The aim of the present study is thus to explore 
the structure of early social games commonly played by mothers, and how infants 
participate in them. In addition to this, we want to investigate whether infants show signs of 
expectations on the game structure by looking at how their participation changes if the 
familiar game is played differently. To do this, twenty 3-month-old infants and mothers 
were observed playing a structured, multimodal game in the lab as they usually do at home, 
and subsequently a unimodal, violated version of the same game: without gestures and 
without sounds. Limbs Movements, Gaze Away and facial expressions were coded and 
compared across conditions, to measure changes in the infants’ behaviour as response to 
violations of the game as expected.  
                                                
6See Murray and Trevarthen (1986) and Nadel, Carchon, Kervella, Marcelli, and 
Réserbat-Plantey (1999) for contingency expectancies studies; see also Tronick, Als, 
Adamson, Wise, and Brazelton (1978) for still face paradigm studies. 
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3.2. Method 
Participants 
Twenty mothers and their 3-month-old infants (10 girls, 10 boys, M= 96 days; SD= 4.04 
days) participated in the study. All the mothers have been living in the UK since at least ten 
years, and two mothers out of 20 were not native British citizens. All infants were 
Caucasian and on average healthy birth weight (M= 3.36 Kg, SD= 0.40 Kg). Seven infants 
were firstborns, four were born with slight complications, three mothers underwent a 
caesarean and one mother had a particularly long labour. The mothers’ ages at the time of 
birth ranged from 26 to 37 years (M= 31 years, SD= 3.44). Five dyads were excluded from 
the original sample of 25 infants due to the infants’ fussiness and lack of interest at the 
beginning or in the middle of the procedure. Volunteer parents were recruited through 
different children and family centres, nurseries and pre/antenatal classes in town, which 
resulted in an heterogeneous socioeconomic background.  
The Bayley Scales of Infant Development – Second Edition (BSID-II) (Bayley, 
2006) were used to check the infants’ motor maturity, cognitive skills and developmental 
age equivalent. Results from the Bayley Mental and Motor Scales assessment showed that 
only one out of twenty infants scored lower than one percentile under the average in the 
Mental Scale (Mental Index score= 82) but not in the Motor Scale (Motor Index score= 88). 
This baby’s behavioural responses were checked and resulted as not performing 
distinctively different from the average responses of the other infants. Thus, this one baby 
was not removed from the sample. Results are shown in Table 3.1. 
 
 Table 3.1. Bayley Scores and Age Equivalents 
Measure  Mean Index 
Score 
SD Mean Developmental 
Age Equivalent 
Mental Scale 88.51 12.1 2.8 Months 
Motor Scale 92.82 7.8 3 Months 
Note. 1Mental Score Range: 82-104; 2Motor Score Range: 88-105 
 
Procedure 
Mother-infant dyads were observed in a quiet, spacious room, and to avoid any additional 
stress observations were arranged at a convenient time for mothers. All of the procedures in 
the study underwent ethical approval by the Science Faculty Ethics Committee, which 
abides by the BPS Guidelines for Research with Human Participants, and all the mothers 
were asked to sign a written informed consent.  
The observation room contained a soft mat placed on the floor with some toys, a 
table with two chairs and four sofas. The experimenter was helped by an assistant who, at 
the beginning of the observation, asked the mother general information about the infant and 
the kind of games they usually play together. Before administering the BSID the 
experimenter and the infant played on the mat to get familiar for approximately 3 to 5 
minutes. The length of BSID assessment was on average 12 minutes. Then the play 
observation began, consisting of three phases: an initial warming up period of 
approximately 5 to 7 minutes, a “normal” performance of a familiar game (normal 
condition) and then two variations of that same game (no-sound and no-gestures 
conditions). 
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Since our specific interest was to explore whether changes in the multimodal 
elements composing the game format affect infants’ participation in the game, we focused 
on violations which do not expose the infant to a maternal withdrawal of engagement. In 
the normal condition phase, our baseline episode, mothers were asked to play one or two 
routine social games of the kind of nursery rhymes, in the same way she would normally do 
at home. As described above, these kind of social games have a vocal-kinetic format, as 
they are compound by a (usually) rhymed song accompanied by hand gestures. To 
investigate the infants’ participation and expectations on the game structure, mothers were 
asked to perform the same game in two variants: once without using any sound (no-sound 
condition) and once without doing any gestures (no-gestures condition). Namely, mothers 
made no movements in the no-gesture condition, and made no sounds in the no-sound 
condition. The performance of each condition was spaced out by approximately two 
minutes of free interaction, and the violated conditions sequence was randomized between 
and within infants to control for order effect.  
Mothers were not instructed to avoid any particular affective behaviour (i.e. to 
display a neutral face, or avoid smiling, or looking at the infant), but encouraged to hold the 
baby in the same position she had done during the normal condition, also when she had to 
make no gestures. For instance, if the position of the infant was to be held up by the armpit 
in the normal version of the game, we asked the mother to keep holding the baby in the 
same way in all the three conditions. In the no-gestures condition the mother was asked not 
to move her hands or the baby (shaking, pulling, bouncing up and so on), whatever her 
position. If the infant gave signs of distraction or discomfort, the procedure was stopped 
and resumed from the last game condition (when possible); this happened three times out of 
20 infants, spread over conditions.  
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The entire sequence was videotaped by two cameras mounted on tripods. One 
camera was positioned on a 45° angle from the mother, triadically with the camera and the 
infant; the other camera was fixed focusing on the mat to be used for the BSID assessment.  
Coding 
The infants’ Limbs Movements, Gaze Away, and Affects (Positive and Negative) were 
coded from video recordings of the entire procedure. These measures have been widely 
used in the literature on infants’ social expectations (Toda & Fogel, 1993; Legerstee & 
Markova, 2007). For instance, attention patterns like gaze orientation are revealing of 
infants’ emotions: Infants have been shown to look intently at interesting stimuli, but to 
avert gaze from a person who stare at them impassively (Tronick et al., 1978; Toda & 
Fogel, 1993). Body movements have been found to be powerful indicators of infants’ 
discrimination of the other’s intentional versus unintentional actions (Behne et al., 2005), 
and infants’ anticipatory adjustments (Service, 1984; Reddy et al., 2013). As Adolph and 
Berger wrote (2006), “Movement is perhaps the most ubiquitous, pervasive, and 
fundamental of all psychological activity. It is the hallmark of animacy and the essence of 
agency” (p. 181). The relative frequency of presence/absence of each behaviour was coded 
second-by-second, and only once for each second by a coder blind to the experimental 
hypotheses and conditions. For the coding we used ELAN, a video-analysis software that 
allows for the creation of complex annotations on video and audio resources (Wittenburg et 
al., 2006). A second blind observer independently coded 50% of the infants (10 infants in 
all three conditions). Inter-observer agreement was determined by using Cohen’s Kappa 
coefficient. Reliability was high for all behaviours (Positive Affects κ = .82, Negative 
Affects, κ= .75, Gaze Away, κ= .78, Limbs Movements, κ= .85; all p< .001). 
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Limbs Movements are the combined coding of arms and legs. A code of leg or arm 
movement was assigned when there was a substantial change of position in space observed 
in arms or legs. Shivers, trembling or jerky moves were not considered as movements.  
Gaze Away. The infants’ gaze was coded as “Away” every time the infant looked 
sideways, up to the ceiling or when the infant’s head was turned off from the mother’s face.  
Positive and Negative Affects. Infants’ facial expressions were coded as “Positive” 
and “Negative” Affects (Camras & Shutter, 2010). Positive Affect was encoded as smiles 
(raised cheeks and corner of lips turned up with mouth open or closed) and laughs (raised 
cheeks, mouth open, lower and upper gum visible, eyes open or winked, possibly 
accompanied by some vocalisations). A code of Negative Affect was assigned to frowns 
(furrowed brow and downturned mouth) and sad expressions (mouth, eye brows and cheeks 
turned down) (Legerstee & Markova, 2007). 
Stunned Expression. A coding of Stunned Expression was assigned when the infant 
showed wide open eyes, open mouth or mouth close but still, neutral lips (Meltzoff & 
Moore, 1977). Previous studies on violations of expectations have used ‘puzzlement’ as 
dependant variable as index of the infant’s reaction to ambiguous and unexpected stimuli 
(Tronick, 1989; Camras et al., 2002). With respect to stunned expressions though, 
puzzlement seems a less neutral measure. So, we decided to code components of 
puzzlement such as eyebrow frowning and downturned lips as Negative Affect; instead, 
with Stunned Expression we wanted to capture as widely as possible any infants’ reaction 
of surprise and uncertainty. 
Games durations and selection 
We asked the mothers to play a routine game which included singing a song and 
gesturing, that was also familiar for the infant. When dyads had more than one type of 
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game recorded, we used the game that was more familiar for the infant according to what 
mothers told us in the preliminary interview. When played normally, games lasted 
approximately 28s (M= 28.04s, SD= .24); when violations were introduced, games mostly 
maintained their original lengths (no-gestures: M= 27.9s, SD= 1.4s; no-sound: M= 27.5s, 
SD=1.2s). A Friedman’s analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to control that 
game durations within babies had not significantly changed when the mothers introduced 
the two violations. Tests were conducted using Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels of .02 
(.05/3). Results confirmed that games lengths across conditions did not significantly differ 
(χ2 (2)= 2.784, p= .249), and therefore games lengths have not been standardised. 
Data Analyses 
Because of the nature and quality of data (frequencies), the small sample size and repeated 
observations, non-parametric repeated measures analyses were performed. Tests were 
conducted using Bonferroni correction of .01 per test (.05/5), and were exact and two tailed. 
Friedman's ANOVA has been used to compare infants' Limbs Movements, Gaze Away and 
affective expressions across conditions (normal, no-gestures and no-sound). ANOVA 
results were followed-up by pairwise comparisons between conditions using Wilcoxon 
Signed Ranks test. A nonparametric measure of the effect size, r, was used (Ivarsson et al., 
2013) and results are showed in the following section. No significant effect of the order in 
which the two violated conditions were presented was found.
 
77 
 
3.3. Results 
Games description 
The dyads we observed played games which present similar formats, with few structural 
differences. They are built on units of sequenced actions formed by patterns of gestures and 
vocalisations often repeated throughout the game. Games differed in their basic features, 
i.e. rhythm, type of gesturing, voice tone, the position of the infant and the mother (see 
Table 3.2.). Some games had the infant upright seating with arms held forward by the 
mother, others had the infant laying on the back; few games had the infant made flying up 
and down held on the waist by the mother. Similar games appeared to have been adapted by 
mothers and showed some variations, mainly in the infant’s posture. For example “Row 
Row Row your Boat”, in which the mother performs a rowing motion so that the infant 
repeatedly leans towards the mother and away, was played in three different variants: with 
the infant’s upright seated, or laying on the mat or embedded in to the mother’s stretched 
legs. Overall, the games appeared to be well tuned on to the infants’ attentional abilities, 
alternating patterns of increasing stimulation (e.g. higher pitch of voice, faster movements) 
with periods of decreasing activity and pauses. Furthermore, their structure was build up on 
repetitions and rhymes. In “Head, Shoulder, Knees and Toes”, for instance, the refrain was 
symmetrically placed at the beginning and the end of the game, as opening and closure, but 
sung with a different intonation.  
Qualitative observations of the videos also revealed similar individual patterns of 
movements in infants playing the same kind of games in the normal conditions. For 
instance, infants playing “Row Row Row your Boat” showed similar frequencies of Limbs 
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Movements: higher within the first 5s of the game (M= 4, SD= .07), decreasing in the 
middle (approximately after 10-12s; M= 3.25, SD= .66) and lower in the last 5 seconds of 
the game (M= 3.11, SD= .57). On the contrary, infants playing “Head, Shoulder, Knees and 
Toes” moved both the arms and legs more in the middle of the game (approximately after 9 
to 10s; M= 4.67, SD= .04) compared to the first 5 seconds of the game (M= 3.33, SD= .47) 
and the last 5 seconds (M= 2.33, SD= 0.47). Examples of two infants’ individual bodily 
patterns are shown in Figure 3.1. and 3.2. Higher scores represent movements of both the 
arms and the legs simultaneously, whereas lower scores represent single movements either 
of the arms or the legs or absence of movements.  
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Figure 3.1. represents individual patterns of one infant (R.). The first peak of arms 
and legs movements appears after about 5 seconds from the beginning in the normal 
condition, but only after about 6 seconds in the no-sound. Similarly, another peak of 
movements is shown after approximately 12 seconds when the game is played normally, 
only to appear with almost one second later in both the violated conditions. Furthermore, 
the infant moves from the beginning to the completion of the routine, i.e. form the first to 
the last second, only when the game is played normally and with gestures, but he starts 
moving one second later in the no sound condition. Similar results were found in 12 infants 
out of 20, showing that 6 infants delayed their movements only in the no-sound condition, 4 
infants delayed their movements in both the no-sound and no-gestures conditions and 2 
infants only in the no-gestures condition. 
Figure 3.2. depicts another infant (K.) during “Head, Shoulder, Knees and Toes”. 
When the game is played normally, K. moves more and for longer periods than in the no-
sound or no-gesture conditions. She also holds longer periods of arms and legs stillness 
when the game has no sound compared to its normal version, with movements eventually 
fading out as the game comes to the end. Since K appears to be overall very active when 
the game is played normally, moving frequently and often combining both arms and legs, 
her periods of stillness in both the no-sound and no-gestures conditions stand out even 
more evidently than in R. 
Figure 3.3. shows baby R. playing Hickory, Dickory Dock, and how his 
participation changed when the game was altered. During the normal version of the game, 
R. is openly laughing, and his upper body seems slightly twisted, as to accompany the 
mother’s movement (Figure 3.3A). He vocalizes vividly, and seems enjoying the play 
interaction. When the game is played with no gestures, R. gazes away and does not show 
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signs of enjoyment. His arms and legs are still and relaxed, and he seems attending to 
something external, behind the camera (Figure 3.3B). When the game is played with no 
sound, R. appears very concentrated on the mother’s action, but not affectively 
participating: He does not show any positive affect (Figure 3.3C). 
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Figure 3.2. Individual Limbs Movements of K. playing Head, Shoulder, Knees and Toes in 
the three conditions. The order of condition presented was normal, no-sound and no-
gesture. A score of 2 indicates movements of both the arms and the legs simultaneously, 
whereas a score of 1 indicates a single movement of either the arms or the legs. A score of 
0 indicates absence of movement. 
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3A 
3C 
3B 
Figure 3.3. R. playing Hicory Dickory Dock normally (A), with no-gestures (B), 
and no-sound (C). 
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Effect of games violations on the infants’ behaviour 
Mean and standard deviation values of the infants’ behavioural responses are presented in 
Table 3.3. Analyses of Friedman’s ANOVA were conducted for each of the dependent 
measures, revealing significant effect of game violations on Limbs Movements χ2 (2) = 
27.410, p < .001, Gaze Away, χ2 (2) = 13.914, p = .001, Positive Affect, χ2 (2) = 29.059, p < 
.001, and Stunned Expression, χ2 (2) = 8.044, p = .001. No significant differences were 
found for Negative Affect, χ2 (2) = 5.344, p = .069. The Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test showed 
that Limbs Movements were significantly higher in the normal compared to the no-sound 
(z= -3.923, p< .001, r= .877) and no-gestures (z= -3.728, p< .001, r= .877) conditions. 
According to Cohen (1988), the effect of these differences was large in both cases. No 
differences were found between the two violated conditions (z= -1.192, p= .233). Gaze 
Away comparisons showed that infants gazed away more often in the no-sound than the 
normal (z= -3.626, p< .001, r= .468), and no-gestures condition (z= -2.600, p= .009, r= 
.335.) but not in the no-gestures compared to normal condition (z= -1.462, p= .144). 
Positive Affect was significantly higher in the normal condition than the no-sound (z= -
3.652, p< .001, r= .471) and no-gestures (z= -2.883, p= .004, r= .372), and significantly 
higher in the no-gestures condition than the no-sound (z= -3.823, p< .001, r= .493). Results 
also showed that infants had significantly more Stunned Expressions in the no-sound 
compared to the normal condition (z= -2.546, p= .001, r= .328), and in the no-sound 
compared to no-gestures (z= -3.453, p= .001, r= .445). No significant increase in Stunned 
Expression was found in the no-gesture (z= -.577, p= .564) compared to the normal 
condition. 
 Table 3.3. Means and standard deviations of relative behavioural frequencies 
Note. The maximum duration of the games in every condition was 30 seconds, thus each 
behavioural measure may range from 0 to 30. 
Behavioural Measure Normal No-gestures No-sound 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Limbs Movements 25.9 9.49 18.20 7.17 15.01 6.04 
Gaze Away 1.20 0.96 1.65 0.89 2.65 1.08 
Positive Affect 2.85 1.31 1.9 0.77 0.75 0.62 
Negative Affect 0.5 0.29 0.75 0.34 1.1 0.39 
Stunned Expression 0.21 0.09 0.35 0.12 0.80 0.28 
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3.4. Discussion 
The present study explored early play routines of 3-month-old infants and their mothers, 
and observed the infant’s behaviour when these routines were disrupted. As there is very 
little literature about early play routines, our aim was firstly to describe them in order to 
understand their structure, and what kind of participatory affordances do they offer to 
infants.  
In addition to this we wanted to observe whether the infants’ participatory 
behaviour would change as a result of unexpected alterations of the game. Our analyses 
showed that when the game was violated with sound and gesturing disjointed (in both the 
no-gestures and no-sound conditions), the majority of infants significantly decreased their 
movements, gazed away from the mother more often and decreased their positive affect 
display. Furthermore, they presented increased Stunned Expressions, especially when the 
game was played without any sound. Overall, we can argue that the infant’s participation in 
the game was poorer in the altered conditions. A possible explanation for this may be that 
infants are more likely to experience interactions that are coordinated at the motor-auditory 
level, involving sounds without gestures, rather than gesturing movements not 
accompanied by any vocalisation (Mehus, 2011). Yet, these findings may lead to different 
interpretations. On the one hand, violations may have not been recognised as such, but 
simply experienced as different, less engaging activities than the fully enacted games. Or, 
infants might have become tired or bored as the procedure went on, and therefore engaged 
less. Support for this interpretation comes from absence of any signs of distress (in terms of 
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Negative Affect), as typical when expectations are violated, and presence of some signs of 
inattention (such as Gaze Away). Yet, this would not explain why infants showed more 
Stunned Expressions.  
An alternative interpretation which may be advanced is that infants’ decreased their 
participation by smiling and laughing less, showing increased Stunned Expressions and 
being more bodily still, as the result of confusion for something ambiguous that did not 
match their usual experience (Tronick et al., 1978). According to this interpretation, infants 
may have developed expectations regarding how the mother usually behaves in such 
specific interactions, which in turn affected the quality of their participation when the 
familiar game was violated. We support this second alternative. The most persuasive 
evidence for it is infants’ dramatic behavioural change in the altered conditions even if the 
mother had not withdrawn from the interaction and was still offering some level of 
stimulation. This represents a point of difference with most of the research using violation 
paradigm, in which the adult interrupts an initiated interaction or strongly reduces her 
interactional engagement (by suspending the gesturing or singing). A weakened 
engagement in the game and –even more importantly- the loss of its playful quality, as 
shown by the decrease in positive affect, might mean that the infants were not so much 
affected by a lack of maternal contingency or affective attunement, (as observed in many 
contingency violation studies1) but rather by alterations of an established game structure. If 
this interpretation is correct, play routines may constitute early interactional contexts on 
which infants have expectations as structured units of coupled auditory and motor 
resources. Past research has revealed an aspect of ‘trans-modal’ musicality in early 
conversations and games built on the precise time coordination between voice and actions, 
which supports the intersubjective engagement (Trevarthen, 1999). 
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Observing the games structures, we found that they provide the infants with 
multiple opportunities of engaging in the interaction. Furthermore, they seem to represent a 
“ready-to-use”, interactive tool for parents. We think that compared to free play, these 
structures enable and sustain the infant’s participation in the interaction for long periods, 
supporting the development of interactive competences of reading complex 
communications. Surprisingly, the games we observed presented similar lengths and format 
even if their structure differed, suggesting that they may respond to specific developmental 
needs: to be entertaining for the infant, to facilitate an affective and pleasant experience 
between the infant and the mother, and have a flexible structure to be adapted to the baby’s 
emerging capacities (cognitive, attentional, motor capacities). As routines, these games may 
also have a developmental function: conceiving a routine, whatever that might be, as a 
sequence of recognisable tasks-so-far (Lerner et al., 2011) enables its understanding as 
based on a situated, practical grasp of that routine instead of relying on some cognitive 
representation of it. In other words, it may enable infants of being capable partners in joint 
actions (as they recognise and have expectations on it) even without possessing higher-level 
social knowledge. Under this view, infants are not passive recipients of actions performed 
on them, but rather capable of active participation in any joint routine. Play routines might 
also represent early communicative contexts which prepare the ground for later, more 
complex multimodal interactions, such as verbal exchanges (Bruner, 1975; Bullowa, 1979).  
Infants’ development in the first year shows how being involved in the expressions 
and emotional transformations of vocal games can facilitate interest in sharing meanings 
(Trevarthen, 1999). As Goodwin (2013) has proposed, interactions are co-operative and 
transformative in the sense that “Actors can build new action by selectively reusing 
resources provided by a prior action” (p. 1), suggesting that if interactions are constructed 
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out of different resources then even non-verbal participants may co-contribute to the 
building up of an interaction. Multimodality can be therefore framed as structuring and 
facilitating early interactions through co-participation. 
3.5. Conclusions 
Whatever interpretation we support, this study has led us to reflect about how an embodied 
participation in joint routines generates expectations on the partners’ mutual commitment to 
participate in a certain - though not identical – way. The pleasure of participating seems at 
least partially conditional to recognising the moves in the sequence and being therefore able 
to cooperate to and in it. Since this is the first work to explore early structured play, it also 
presents various limitations. For instance, to endorse an ecological approach and explore 
how early social games worked in the first place, we decided not to constrain mothers to 
play a specific game but rather focus on their spontaneous way of playing. This is why only 
the two violated conditions have been counterbalanced, but not the normal one. We 
preferred to always start with the normal game to preserve (and grasp) the infant’s 
spontaneous engagement with a familiar routine, which would not be possible if we started 
with the other conditions. 
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4. EXPOLORING INFANTS’ SENSITIVITY TO DELAY DURING A PICK-UP 
ROUTINE 
Abstract 
Infants actively participate in the joint routine of being picked up by an adult, making the 
interaction smoother and more effective. The aim of the present study was to investigate 
infants’ responses to a delay in the flow of the pick-up sequence. Twenty-three 3-month-old 
infants were observed during natural interactions with their mothers, where mothers were 
instructed (1) to pick up their infants as they usually did, and then (2) to delay the pick-up 
for 5 seconds after placing their hands on the infant’s waist. In both normal and delayed 
pickup episodes we coded infant’s Body Tension, gaze and affective expressions during 
three phases: Approach, Contact and Lift. Additionally, we measured infants’ Head Lag 
during Lift. Results showed that during normal pick-up infants displayed higher Body 
Tension, more Positive Affect, a tendency to look longer at the mother’s face and a smaller 
Head Lag during Lift. During delayed pick-up infants showed lower Body Tension and 
more signs of distress, shifted their gaze Away from the mother’s face and increased the 
Head Lag during Lift. These findings suggest that infants are capable of real time 
adjustments to maternal behaviours which ease the pick-up interaction, as they recognise 
her intentions-in-actions. Additionally, these findings suggest that infants are cooperatively 
participating in the joint routine of being picked up. 
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4.1. Introduction 
Cooperating is a fundamental way of doing things with others that we learn from very early 
on, and many researchers from philosophy and psychology have investigated its emergence 
during childhood. Mainstream accounts of cooperation have depicted the ability to 
cooperate as depending on inferential abilities, proposing that participants engage in 
cooperative actions only if they are able to infer each other’s thoughts and plans, and 
combine them to build their co-actions to successfully achieve a common goal (Bratman, 
1992; Tuomela, 1993, 2005; Gilbert, 2000; Pacherie, 2006). However, this view 
presupposes a propositional knowledge of others’ intentions and relational experience, 
which are too sophisticated psychological concepts to study how cooperation emerges 
developmentally (Tollefsen, 2005; Butterfill, 2012; Fantasia, De Jaegher, & Fasulo, 2014). 
Alternative approaches focusing on embodied experiences of interactions have 
suggested that intentions are “visible” through observing others’ movements (Reddy, 2008; 
Tollefsen & Dale, 2012; Ansuini, Cavallo, Bertone, & Becchio, 2014), which implies a 
fundamental reformulation of the concept of cooperation and its development in infancy. 
Accordingly, to understand others’ intentions requires experience with others’ actions, 
through observation and participation, which is something that even infants do daily. In this 
paper we examined 3-months-old infants’ sensitivity to caregivers’ intentions-in-action 
during a pick-up interaction. By showing that infants adjust their actions according to their 
caregivers’ behaviour during this early cooperative routine, we aim to provide evidence for 
the argument that understanding others’ intentions may not necessarily require complex 
inferential abilities, but rather is embedded in the embodied participation in joint routines.  
98 
Joint routines are recurrent interactions which infants experience from their very 
first days of life. In fact, starting at birth infants are involved in goal-directed routines 
scaffolded by their caregivers, such as having a diaper changed (Nomikou & Rohlfing, 
2012), being fed (Kochukhova & Gredebäck, 2010), playing (Bruner & Sherwood, 1976; 
Ratner & Bruner, 1978; Fantasia, Fasulo, Costall, & López, 2014) and being picked up 
(Reddy, Markova & Wallot, 2013). These routines are often structured through repetitions 
of action sequences (often with or on objects), and performed at particular times and in 
particular places, with some variability depending on the routine. These routine interactions 
are also dynamic and thus require continuous adjustments and physical coordination 
between the mother and the infant (Stern, 1974; Bruner, 1975). Such extensive practice in 
coordinating with others’ movements and objects (as, for instance, in the case of diaper 
changing or dressing) arguably has an impact on infants’ general development, because it 
provides, for instance, opportunities for manual exploration and reaching (Adolph, Karasik, 
& Tamis-LeMonda, 2012), and increases the infants’ sensitivity to the caregivers’ 
structured actions (Noumikou & Rohlfing, 2011; Hilbrink et al., 2014). Furthermore, 
routines support the exploration of affective and motor contingencies, and thus allow 
infants to form expectations about others’ behaviour (Lamb & Malkin, 1986; Ross & 
Lollis, 1987; Legerstee & Markova, 2007; Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010; Fantasia et al., 
2014).  
Because routines are built up around turns of action, they resemble early dialogues 
between infants and caregivers, thus grounding the emergence of communicative skills in 
infancy (Berducci, 2010; Lerner, Zimmerman, & Kidwell, 2011). In fact, caregivers usually 
consider infants as competent interactants (Bruner, 1975; Vedeler, 1993; Raczaszek-
Leonardi, Nomikou, & Rohlfing, 2013). In many ways, being involved in joint routines 
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increases and supports the infants’ emergent social and cognitive development (Hubley & 
Trevarthen, 1979; Hubley, 1983). 
Recent evidence shows that even 2-month-old infants are able to make specific 
postural adjustments when mothers approach to pick them up (Reddy et al., 2013), if 
caregivers’ kinematic approach is clear and visible so that infants are given time to 
recognise the action and prepare for it (Fogel, 1993). At 5 months of age, and even at 3 
with previous experience, infants are able to determine the goal-directedness of human 
action (Woodward, 1998; Sommerville, Woodward, & Needham, 2005), and at around 6 
months infants are able to anticipate the goals of observed actions, such as the target of a 
grasping hand (Falck-Ytter, Gredebäck, & von Hofsten, 2006; Kanakogi & Itakura, 2011; 
Ambrosini, Reddy, de Looper, Costantini, & López, 2013), and to discriminate different 
intentions of other people (Marsh, Stavropoulos, Nienhuis, & Legerstee, 2010). This 
suggests that infants can discriminate between movements performed with different 
intentions, particularly when these movements are embedded in familiar actions.  
As a routine, being picked up enables infants to form expectations about the 
caregivers’ actions (Service, 1984; Reddy et al., 2013), or the contingencies in which these 
actions would occur, as shown by 4- to 5-month-old infants’ expectation to be picked up 
when distressed (Lamb & Malkin, 1986). At around 6 to 7 months of age infants request to 
be picked up by lifting their arms up in response to mothers’ approach (Lock, 1984), 
although this response is strongly affected by maternal style of picking up, and 
communication in general (Service, 1984). These results suggest that infants understand 
other’s intentions as observable actions during pick-up interactions and respond 
accordingly.  
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However, having expectations and anticipating the other’s movements is one step 
on the way to understanding others’ intentions, but it is different from cooperatively 
participating in an interaction. The question of how infants contribute to a joint routine and 
whether they cooperate in it is still open. Some studies have investigated early cooperative 
skills in young children by adopting specifically designed laboratory tasks involving role 
reversal, problem-solving or simultaneous coordination of movements (e.g., Brownell & 
Carriger, 1990; Warneken, Chen, & Tomasello, 2006; Warneken, Gräfenhain, & 
Tomasello, 2012). In these studies, successfully performed joint tasks set the age threshold 
for attributing cooperative abilities and instrumental helping to children; yet, due to their 
task demands they cannot be applied with very young infants, and thus do not allow to 
investigate possible earlier forms of cooperative participations.  
The goal of the present study was to examine whether and how infants 
cooperatively participate in a pick-up interaction. We first observed 3-month-olds and their 
mothers during a natural sequence of picking up and putting down and then asked mothers 
to delay the pick-up sequence after having contacted the infants’ waist. Following previous 
research showing that infants facilitate and contribute to the pick-up episode by stiffening 
their bodies (Reddy et al., 2013) we hypothesised that a delay in the pick-up episode would 
affect the infants’ cooperative participation, defined as body tension, head alignment with 
the body and gaze to the mother. We expected that infants would hold their body tensed 
and head aligned to the body to ease the interaction in the normal pick-up, but they would 
lose this tension when the pick-up sequence was delayed.  
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4.2. Method 
Participants 
Twenty-three 3-month-old infants (10 girls, Mage = 96.04 days, SD = 3.92 days) participated 
in the study. All infants were healthy at birth, Caucasian, and came from lower to middle 
class families, as determined by parental reports on years of education. Maternal age at time 
of birth ranged from 26 to 37 years (Mage = 31 years, SD = 3.17 years). Volunteer parents 
were recruited through different family centres, nurseries and pre/antenatal classes in town. 
Two dyads were excluded from the original sample of 25 infants due to the infants’ 
fussiness and lack of interest during the procedure.  
The Bayley Scales of Infant Development – Second Edition (BSID-II; Bayley, 1993) 
were used to control for infants’ motor maturity, cognitive skills and equivalent 
developmental age. One infant scored lower than one percentile under the average on the 
Mental Scale (Mental Index score = 82). However, this infant’s behavioural responses were 
not different from the average responses of the other infants in the sample, thus this infant 
was included in the final sample. 
Materials and Procedure 
Mother-infant dyads were observed in a quiet, spacious room at the University Infant 
laboratory, at a convenient time for the mothers. Prior to the start of the testing session 
mothers signed a written informed consent and were asked whether their infants appeared 
to be showing any anticipation of their actions in general and, more specifically, of 
impending picks-up in various situations. Then the experimenter and the infant played for 
approximately 3 to 5 min to familiarise the infant with the setting before administering the 
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BSID. The BSID average assessment length was 12 min, and then the testing began. Infants 
were laid down on a Tekscan7 sensor mat (47 cm x 47 cm), which was placed on a plastic 
changing mat on a low table (36 cm off the floor). Interactions were filmed with a digital 
camera that focused on the infant (recording at 30 frames per second).  
All dyads were observed in two conditions: (1) normal and (2) delayed pick-up 
episodes. In the normal pick-up episode, which was always tested first, mothers were 
instructed to chat with their infants and pick them up a few times during the interaction 
whenever they felt infants were comfortable and attentive, ensuring that the infants could 
see their arms as they approached to pick them up. To choose one of the pick-up episodes 
to be coded in this condition, we applied the same criteria described by Reddy et al. (2013). 
There was disagreement about the criteria in two cases, which was resolved following re-
viewing of the video material. 
Following the normal pick-up, mothers were asked to repeat the same procedure, 
except that they were instructed to delay the pick-up after placing their hands on the 
infants’ waist, and hold it for approximately 6s. After 6s of delay the experimenter 
signalled to mothers to complete the picking up sequence, by snapping her fingers. Because 
our aim was to violate infants’ expectations, the delayed pick-up was only tested once for 
each dyad and always following the normal pick-up. In one case, however, the mother had 
to repeat the delayed pick-up procedure due to the infant’s fussiness. 
                                                
7The Tekscan sensor mat consists of pressure sensors with a sampling rate of 20 Hz. 
Although the sensor mat was part of the testing procedure, the data extracted from it are not 
used in the present study. 
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Measures 
Identifying phases within pick-up episodes. Three phases were identified for each normal 
and delayed pick-up episodes: (1) Approach: beginning from the onset of the mother’s arms 
starting to approach the infant until Contact; (2) Contact: beginning from the onset of the 
mother’s hands contacting the infant’s waist until the onset of Lift; (3) Lift: beginning from 
the movements of mother’s hands on the infant’s waist until the infant’s body was 
completely detached from the mat. Mean durations for each of these three phases were as 
follows: Approach = 2.49s, Contact = 2.05s and Lift = 1.54s in the normal condition, and 
Approach = 1.55s, Contact = 8.32s and Lift = 1.48s in the delayed condition. Repeated-
measures ANOVAs were performed to compare the duration of each phase, with condition 
as the within-subjects factor. Results showed that both the Approach and Contact phase 
durations were longer in the normal condition compared to the delayed one, F(1, 22) = 
5.279, p = .031, η² = .194, 95% CI [.09, 1.789] and F(1, 22) = 195.93, p < .00, η² = .899, 
[5.34, 7.2], while there was no significant difference in the duration of Lift phase between 
conditions, F(1, 22) = .339, p = .566, η² = .015, 95% CI [.172, .305]. The difference in 
Approach duration in the two conditions may be due the procedure order: Since the delayed 
condition was always presented after the normal one, mothers may have acquired 
familiarity with the procedure so that the second pick-up episode was generally quicker 
than the first one. A second possible explanation may regard an increase in the infants 
overall attentiveness in the delayed condition. Infants may have been more alerted and 
focused on the mother’s behaviour after the second pick-up episode. Thus, since we asked 
the mothers to pick their infants only when these were comfortable and attentive, the 
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mothers may have speeded up the approach in the second pick-up episode, as infants 
appeared more attentive from the beginning.  
One coder viewed and identified the frame points for the onset of Approach and 
Contact, and onset and offset of Lift for all infants in both conditions (normal and delayed). 
A second coder independently viewed 25% of the video material in both conditions. The 
coders disagreed on two pick-up episodes out of 24 (within 10 video frames, i.e., at 30 fps, 
1/3 of a sec). Coefficients of agreement for each phase and condition are presented in Table 
4.1. 
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Table 4.1. Intra-class correlations for all measures in the present study. 
Measure 
 
ICC 
Phases Approach 1 
 Contact 
0.999 
  Lift 0.998 
Gaze Mother’s Face 0.967 
 
Mother’s Body 0.861 
 
Away from Mother 0.913 
Body tension  
 
0.97 
Head Lag  Beginning 
0.996 
Halfway 0.998 
Affects Positive 
0.906 
Negative 1 
Behavioural coding. A pick-up routine mainly involves physical contact and bodily 
adjustments (Service, 1984; Reddy et al., 2013). Infants’ motor behaviour is thus a crucial 
index of their involvement and contribution to the pick-up sequence. Therefore, we 
measured the duration of infants’ Body Tension as periods involving the co-occurrence of 
arms stretched out and legs either extended and stiffened or tucked in. In order to measure 
infants’ social involvement, we coded the durations of Gaze to Mother’s Face, Gaze to 
Mother’s Body or Gaze Away, and frequency of Positive and Negative Affect. Positive 
Affect was defined by smiles (raised cheeks and corner of lips turned up with mouth open or 
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closed) and laughs (raised cheeks, mouth open, lower and upper gum visible, eyes open or 
winked, possibly accompanied by some vocalisations), whereas Negative Affect was 
defined by frowns (furrowed brow and downturned mouth) and sad expressions (mouth, 
eye brows and cheeks turned down) (see also Legerstee & Markova, 2007).  
Previous research has shown that infants tend to look longer to their partner or shift 
their gaze frequently in response to unexpected behaviours (Phillips, Baron-Cohen & 
Rutter, 1992; Bertin, Striano, 2006). To investigate whether infants would try to 
disambiguate the mother’s behaviour when the pick up was delayed (which is indeed a 
rather ambiguous situation) we measured how many times the infants shifted their gaze 
from the mother’s face to away and from the mother’s face to the mother’s body. Durations 
(for Body Tension Gaze to the Mother) and frequencies (for Positive and Negative Affect 
and Gaze Shifts) were adjusted according to the duration of each phase in both conditions. 
Only these relative frequencies and durations were used for further analyses.  
Reddy et al. (2013) reported that when approached to be picked up infants 
sometimes turned their head or raised the chin, strengthening the neck, reducing its lag, and 
thereby facilitating the lift. To include a measure of infants’ head-neck strength facilitating 
the caregivers’ movements and thus contributing to the pick-up, we observed infants’ Head 
Lag during the Lift phase in both normal and delayed pick-up. Using Dartfish, a video 
analysis software, we calculated the angle between chin, chest and neck border for each 
infant at two points: beginning of Lift (i.e., corresponding to the onset of the Lift phase) 
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and halfway through Lift8 (i.e., midpoint in time of the Lift phase). The beginning of the 
Lift was used as a baseline to control for each infant’s individual angle when the head was 
leaning on the mat. If infants’ head dropped backward during the Lift (i.e. Head Lag), then 
this resulted in an increase of the measured angle at the midpoint of the Lift phase. We 
hypothesised that the Head Lag would increase in the delayed compared to the normal pick-
up, because the delay may leave infants unprepared to be lifted, and thus decreasing their 
neck strength. 
Infant behaviours were coded by one observer blind to the rationale of the study. A 
second observer independently coded 25% of the video material in both conditions. 
Episodes were watched at least twice: initially at normal speed to identify relevant 
behaviours, and then frame by frame to identify onset and offset points of behaviours. 
Inter-observer reliability was assessed using the Intraclass Correlation Coefficient, and 
values ranged from .861 to 1 (see Table 4.1.).  
4.3. Results 
Means and standard deviations for all infant behaviours are presented in Table 3.2. 
Repeated-measures ANOVAs were computed separately for Body Tension, Positive and 
Negative Affect, and Gaze at the Mother’s Face with condition (normal, delayed) and phase 
(Approach, Contact, Lift) as the within-subjects variables. Pairwise comparisons were 
adjusted with a Bonferroni correction. The results showed a significant main effect of 
                                                
8In order to take into account individual variations in the Lift phase duration, we 
chose a time criterion to determine the exact point to measure infants’ head lag, that is the 
midpoint in the duration of each individual lifting phase. 
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condition for Body Tension, F(1, 22) = 24.48, p < .001, η² = .527, 95% CI [.120, .294], and 
a significant interaction between condition and phase, F(2, 44) = 8.828, p = .001, η² = .286. 
Simple contrasts revealed that there was an increase in Body Tension from Approach to 
Contact in the normal condition (p = .016, 95% CI [-.397, -.035]), while there was a 
decrease from Approach to Lift (p = .012, 95% CI [.055, .513]) as well as from Contact to 
Lift (p = .004, 95% CI [.065, .381]) in the delayed condition (Figure 4.1.). 
 
 
There was a significant main effect of condition for Positive Affect, F(1, 22) = 4.957, p = 
.037 η² = .184, 95% CI [.03, .89] and Negative Affect, F(1, 22) = 6.583, p = .018, η² = .23, 
95% CI [.66, .07], indicating that infants showed more positive affect during the normal 
than the delayed pick-up, and more negative affect during the delayed than the normal pick-
Figure 4.1. Mean relative durations of Body Tension across the three phrases in 
normal and delayed pick-up episodes. 
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up. Moreover, there was a significant main effect of phase for positive affect, F(2, 44) = 
6.235, p = .004, η² = .221, indicating that, in both conditions, infants displayed significantly 
less positive affect during Lift compared to Approach (p = .016, 95% CI [.15, 1.71]) and 
Contact (p < .001, 95% CI [.43, 1.42]). 
There was also a marginally significant main effect of condition for Gaze to 
Mother’s Face, F(1, 22) = 3.456, p = .076, η² = .136, 95% CI [-.02, .27], suggesting a 
tendency for infants to look longer at their mothers’ face during normal than during delayed 
picks-up.  
A repeated-measures ANOVA with frequency of Gaze Shift directions (face-to-
mother’s body and face-to-away), condition (normal, delayed) and phase (Approach, 
Contact) as the within-subjects factors. Results showed a significant main effect of phase, 
F(1, 22) = 15.39, p = .001, η² = .412, 95% CI [.14, .45], and condition, F(1, 22) = 42.73, p 
< .001, η² = .66, 95% CI [.39, .76], as well as a significant interaction between phase and 
condition, F(1, 22) = 16.61, p = .001, η² = .43. Simple contrasts indicated that there was no 
difference between Approach and Contact in the normal pick-up (p = .852, 95% CI [-.44, -
.52]), but a significant increase in gaze shifts from Approach to Contact when the pick-up 
was delayed, F(1, 22) = 37.66, p < .001, η² = .631, 95% CI [-1.63, -.81]. No effect of gaze 
shift direction was found. 
Finally, to compare infant Head Lag before and during Lift in the two conditions a 
repeated-measures ANOVA was computed with condition (normal, delayed) and time 
(beginning lift, midway lift) as the within-subjects factors. Results revealed a significant 
main effect of condition, F(1, 22) = 17.94, p < .001, η² = .449, 95% CI [4.81, 14.04], and 
time, F(1, 22) = 126.58, p < .001, η² = .852, 95% CI [15.80, 22.94], as well as a significant 
interaction between condition and time, F(1, 22) = 26.32, p < .001, η² = .545 (see Figure 
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4.2.). Simple contrasts showed that there was no difference between the conditions at the 
beginning of the lift (p = .291, 95% CI [-7.32, 2.30]). However, halfway through the lift 
infant head lag was significantly higher in the delayed than the normal pick-up, F(1, 22) = 
32.73, p < .001, η² = .598, 95% CI [-22.28, -10.42], suggesting that infants’ head had lost 
its strength and was not aligned with the body when the pick-up was delayed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Mean Head Lag angles at the beginning and midpoint of Lift in 
normal and delayed pick-up episodes. 
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Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics for all measures in both conditions and phases 
Measure Normal Delayed 
 
M SD M SD 
Body Tension (relative duration) 
Approach 0.39 0.30 0.46 0.34 
Contact 0.61 0.22 0.40 0.17 
Lift 0.65 0.33 0.17 0.18 
Head Lag (angle) 
Beginning Lift 76.63 13.45 79.14 13.78 
Midpoint Lift 89.08 13.92 105.43 12.78 
Positive Affect (relative frequency) 
Approach 1.33 1.92 0.82 1.14 
Contact 1.39 1.61 0.75 0.85 
Lift 0.27 0.62 0.02 0.10 
Negative Affect (relative frequency) 
Approach 0.19 0.79 0.35 1.13 
Contact 0.01 0.06 0.76 0.83 
Lift 0.16 0.46 0.40 0.58 
Gaze Shifts from Mothers’ Face to Away (frequency) 
Approach .43 .66 .48 .51 
Contact .3 .47 1.26 .69 
Gaze Shifts from Mothers’ Face to Mothers’ Body (frequency) 
Approach .26 .45 .74 .69 
Contact .35 .49 1.18 .89 
Gaze to the Mothers’ Face (relative duration) 
Approach 0.60 0.33 0.48 0.32 
Contact 0.61 0.32 0.46 0.23 
Lift 0.58 0.36 0.48 0.33 
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4.4. Discussion 
The results of the present study add to the picture of infants’ capacity to anticipate a pick-
up episode presented by Reddy et al. (2013), suggesting that from very early on in life 
infants not only understand others’ intentions-in-action directed to the self, but also 
functionally adjust to them. Our goal was to determine whether infants’ bodily adjustments 
might hold a cooperative function in an early routine, such as being picked up. Our results 
indicated that infants increased their body tension as the pick-up interaction unfolded 
normally, during which they also displayed more positive affect and tended to look longer 
at the mother’s face. As predicted, when the pick-up was delayed infants responded by 
decreasing their body tension and head-neck strength (i.e., increase of the Head Lag angle), 
shifting their gaze away from the mother’s face, either to the periphery or to her body, and 
expressing more signs of distress.  
If we consider an interaction as cooperative when each of the subjects is acting to 
complement the other’s response (Hubley & Trevarthen, 1979), then our findings strongly 
suggest that infants’ behaviour was cooperative to the extent that they stiffened their body 
and supported their head contingently, complementing and easing the mother’s movements. 
Moreover, in line with previous findings on infants’ response to violations of expectations 
(Tronick, Als, Adamson, Wise, & Brazelton, 1978; Lamb & Malkin, 1986; Camras et al., 
2002; Fantasia et al., 2014), when the pick-up sequence was delayed the infants’ body was 
limp and the head released backward. In a way it seemed that infants were losing their 
preparedness to be picked up, and thus stopped contributing to the action. Consequently, it 
could be argued that infants did not simply react to an invitation for being picked up, but 
also regulated their participation in it through online adjustments of their bodies. This 
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dynamic may result in a unique matching between maternal style of picking up and the 
infant’s response to it (Service, 1984). 
Previous research demonstrated that from the beginning of life infants experience 
reciprocal, contingent and affective exchanges with caregivers (Brazelton, Koslowski, & 
Main, 1974). When these affective or temporal contingencies are disrupted, infants show 
signs of distress and negative affect (see Adamson & Frick, 2003, for a review). Similarly, 
early routines represent recurrent actions that may easily generate expectations about 
maternal behaviour or the interactional sequence, and whose disruption causes increasing 
negative affect and lack of cooperation, as the results of the present study show. Moreover, 
previous studies reported an increase in infant gaze to an adult’s face when their 
expectations were violated (Phillips, Baron-Cohen, & Rutter, 1992; Behne, Carpenter, Call, 
& Tomasello, 2005; Marsh et al., 2010). In light of this evidence, our finding that infants 
showed a tendency to look longer at their mothers’ faces during the normal pick-up seems 
counterintuitive. However, we also found an increase in gaze shifts from Approach to 
Contact during the delayed pick-up which could be interpreted as an attempt to 
disambiguate the mother’s behaviour. Yet, since these shifts were equally distributed 
between gaze away and to the mother’s body, it is difficult to specify their exact function. 
One possible explanation could be that infants disengaged from the interaction to avoid 
distress (as proposed by previous studies using the Still Face paradigm). Alternatively, gaze 
shifts may be an attempt to grasp and share the mother’s attention in an ambiguous 
situation (Amano, Kezuka, & Yamamoto, 2004), and thus allow infants to track their 
mothers’ action and try to make sense of it.  
Whichever interpretation one favours, our findings suggest that 3-month-old infants 
have some knowledge about how a pick-up routine is structured and sequenced, which 
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enables them to anticipate its occurrence and support it with their movements. This is in 
line with previous findings showing that 3-month-old infants have expectations about the 
structure of early play routines (Fantasia et al., 2014), and that by 8 months of age infants 
can detect invariant elements in segmented words, showing an early sensitivity for 
structures involved in linguistic systems (Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996; Baldwin & 
Baird, 2001). What are the implications of the present findings?  
A first major implication is that infants are clearly not passive recipients of actions 
performed on them, but rather sensitive participants when being picked up. Of course, 
should an adult decide to pick up an infant against her or his will, she would easily succeed 
without much effort. Yet, the motivation and pleasure achieved through this interaction 
might probably not be the same, as infant responsiveness and engagement during the pick-
up is arguably crucial in its potential for motivating the caregiver and fostering the 
intersubjective exchange. Infants’ participation may even be considered a requisite for 
social development. As Berducci has proposed (2010), caregivers incorporate infants into 
interactions by acting on their natural responses, and structuring those into meaningful 
sequences of turn-taking and actions. Without infants’ active responsiveness the entire 
process of interactive co-construction would not exist. 
A second major implication is that our results strongly support a more basic and 
developmental approach to cooperation (Fantasia et al., 2014), which takes into account 
infants’ daily shared practices without appealing to inferential knowledge or attribution of 
intentions. Indeed, intentions are manifested in observable behaviours as they dynamically 
take shape in interactions (Duranti, 1997); what makes behaviours (and thus intentions) 
predictable for infants is the experience of moving together, participating in the interaction 
by progressively coordinating and adjusting with the caregiver’s actions. As Fogel and 
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Thelen (1987) have proposed, social behaviour (and thus, intentions and goals) is not 
behaviour towards but mostly behaviour with others. Doing things together is a 
fundamental way of understanding and knowing others, their thoughts, intentions or 
emotions (McGeer, 2001; Zahavi, 2006; Reddy, 2008; Costall, 2013). Being picked up is 
an action involving physical contact and motor coordination. As suggested by Trevarthen 
(personal communication, 2015), any manipulation of the body by another, even touch or a 
handshake, will excite proximal, proprioceptive (as well as viscero-ceptive, internal) 
sensations of the receiver person. Multimodality is a manifestation of the adaptive 
‘autopoiesis’ of the body and the ‘integrative action of the nervous system’ (Sherrington, 
1906), which maps the body’s potentialities for motor action of many parts with multi-
sensory ‘experience’ (Trevarthen, 2011). In interactions, this experience is fundamentally 
shared through coordination with other’s movements and possibilities for action. 
Some limitations of the present study may affect the interpretation of the results. 
First, the fixed order of conditions (i.e., normal the pick-up was always performed first) 
may have influenced infants’ responses to the subsequent delay in the pick-up sequence by, 
for example, increasing the infants’ attention to the violation of the usual way they are 
picked up. On the other hand, asking mothers to introduce a delay in their natural pick-up 
routine before picking up their infants may have thwarted their naturally-occurring 
behaviours. Second, being picked up twice within a relatively short period of time may 
have taken toll on infants’ attentiveness, resulting in the overall decrease of participation 
showed by infants in the delayed pick-up episode. However, our results indicate that infant 
behaviours were comparable in the approach phase of both conditions, and only during 
contact infants began realising that ‘something is not quite right’. Finally, our study design 
did not allow us to determine the precise point in which infants detected a delay in the pick-
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up flow and changed their behaviour. This is problematic, conceptually as well as 
practically, because infants could make allowances for the delay by expecting to be picked 
up for some time and thus behaving as if the pick-up was not delayed. It could be argued 
that by analysing the whole phase where the change occurs (i.e., contact phase), and not a 
specific time period (e.g., period between when the infant would normally have been 
picked up until it eventually was), we accounted for these individual allowances, and thus 
consider this a conservative approach.  
4.5. Conclusions 
Our primary interest in this study was to explore infants’ behaviour in terms of 
participation in a normal pick-up episode, and their responses to violations of the pick-up 
sequence. With this aim in mind, we needed to make the normal pick-up as appealing as 
possible, avoiding any possible additional fatigue or stress caused by experiencing a 
violation of expectations. However, future research will need to take these limitations into 
account. It would be interesting to investigate possible individual differences in infant’s 
compliance with the adult’s pick-up action as early signs of lack of interest in engagement 
and thus psychopathology. 
To conclude, our results suggest that the observation of infant behaviour in daily, 
familiar practices, such as routines, may reveal aspects of infants’ participation as 
competent and functional, which may not otherwise be observed in other (more artificial) 
contexts. 
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5. RETHINKING INTRUSIVENESS IN POSTPARTUM DEPRESSION 
A Sequential Analysis of Mother-Infant Interactions 
Abstract 
Coordination and alignment are fundamental features in the building up of mutual, 
sequentially organised interactions. The focus on mutual regulation and optimal range of 
stimulation in mother-infant interactions has led research to investigate the cases in which 
difficulties in the maternal behaviour may not support the infant’s experience of 
participation, e.g. maternal intrusiveness. Intrusiveness is presented here in its different 
descriptions as behavioural category, assigned by mainstream research on clinical and non-
clinical populations. In other words, intrusiveness has often been operationalised as a pre-
defined set of maternal behaviours, coded independently from the infant’s behaviour and 
the broader interactional context. The aim of the present work is to investigate 1) the 
consistency of these behavioural categories and 2) their efficacy in analysing the 
interactional dynamics constituting maternal intrusiveness (namely, those specific maternal 
conducts that restrict the infant’s participation in interaction). A microanalysis inspired by 
Conversation Analysis methods was applied to selected episodes of face-to-face 
interactions between mothers and their 3-months-old infants. Through this analysis, 
interactional dimensions such as persistency, alignment, sequential structuring and timing 
emerged and appeared to be essential elements for the interactional organisation, supporting 
(or reducing) the infants’ participation. 
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5.1. Introduction 
The experience of interactive coordination and affective alignment with the caregiver 
supports the infant communicative development and socialisation (Lamb, Bornstein, & 
Teti, 2002; Tronick & Beeghly, 2011). Coordination and alignment are fundamental 
features in the building up of mutual, sequentially organised interactions, where caregivers 
treat the infant as an agentful participant while interacting (Rączaszek-Leonardi, Nomikou 
& Rohlfing, 2013). Exploring how coordination works is crucial to the understanding of 
typical and atypical developmental trajectories (Fogel, 1992; Tamis-LeMonda, Bornstein, 
& Baumwell, 2001; Stern, 2002; Reddy, 2008). The sequential organisation of early joint 
routines supports the creation of regular interactional sequences, in which the caregiver 
contingently acts upon the infant’s action and incorporates it into a conversation-like 
interaction (Berducci, 2010). Different modalities of interactional organisation configure 
opportunities to participate for the infant, either in a supportive or restraining way. 
The caregiver’s role in this dynamic process is essential. The mother’s behaviour 
has been explored for its impact on the quality of early intersubjective relationships. In 
particular, research on clinical populations, and especially on postpartum depressed 
mothers, has focused extensively on maternal intrusiveness (Cohn & Tronick, 1983), 
broadly described as a maternal conduct which interferes with the infants’ participation in 
dyadic interactions.  
The overarching purpose of this paper is to explore what happens, from an 
interactional point of view, when mothers adopt a behaviour identified as intrusive 
according to coding systems widely used with clinical populations; and if, on the contrary, 
there are maternal behaviours which would not fall into these categories but nevertheless 
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appear to produce similar effects to those described in intrusive descriptions. To do so, we 
first briefly reconstruct the history of the development of this behavioural coding label, 
starting with the Mutual Regulation theory. 
The Mutual Regulation Theory 
One of the most recent and well established theories on early interactional dynamics is the 
Mutual Regulation Theory (Tronick & Cohn, 1989; Tronick & Weinberg, 1997). This 
model describes caregiver-infant interaction as constituted by patterns of reciprocal 
behaviours ranging from high affective coordination to affective disengagement. Under this 
account, interaction is a structured system of mutually regulated units of behaviour, as each 
partner’s behaviour is influenced and coordinated through the behaviour of the other 
(Tronick, Als & Adamson, 1979; Cohn & Tronick, 1988). Tronick and Weinberg (1997) 
later hypothesized that early difficulties in the experience of sharing and negotiating affects 
may disrupt the mutual regulatory process. Based on this theory, Tronick, Als & Brazelton 
(1980) developed a scoring system called Monadic Phase Paradigm (MPP).  
The MPP consists of a descriptive analysis of face-to-face interactions which 
captures behavioural dimensions of the mother and the infant such as gaze direction, 
vocalisations, facial expressions, head orientation and body position, and combines them 
into macro-categories called monadic phases. Its categories code both the infant’s and the 
caregiver’s behaviour separately, and only subsequently link together on the basis of the 
time-based matching. Individual behaviours are therefore conceived as independent, as if 
the way partners respond to the each other was not influenced by the other’s previous 
behaviour, and had no constitutive influence on the interactional unfolding. 
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Intrusiveness 
The focus on mutual regulation and optimal range of stimulation in mother-infant 
interactions has led researchers to investigate the cases in which difficulties in the maternal 
behaviour may not support the infant’s experience of active participation, i.e. intrusiveness. 
Intrusiveness has often been described as involving 
A constellation of insensitive, interfering parenting behaviors rooted in mothers’ 
lack of respect for their infants’ autonomy. Central to this conceptualization is the 
notion that the highly intrusive mother has her own agenda in mind as she either 
overwhelms the child with excessive stimulation or interrupts the child’s self-
initiated activity to stop it or change its course (Ispa et al., 2004). 
Initially, intrusive maternal behaviours have been described in terms of over-control and 
under-control (Ricks, 1981), and later on reframed as aspects of over-stimulation and 
directiveness (Pine, 1992). More recently, clinical researchers (i.e. in research on post-
partum depression) have started to label as ‘intrusive’ a defined set of maternal behaviours, 
initially included in the Monadic Phase Paradigm (MPP). Behavioural categories such as 
anger/poke, disengage, elicit, play, originally described by the MPP, have been aggregated 
into macro-categories such as ‘disengaged’, ‘positive’, ‘mixed’ and used to classify 
behavioural patterns of the mothers. Intrusive behaviours were characterised by low levels 
of play and high levels of anger (Cohn et al., 1986; Cohn et al., 1990). 
In few cases, mostly involving clinical populations, intrusiveness has been defined 
as an interactional style (often opposed to a withdrawn style) on the basis of ratings of the 
mother’s behaviour during an observed interaction (Malphurs et al., 1996a; Hatzinikolaou, 
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& Murray, 2010; Diego et al., 2002). Other studies, on the contrary, have attributed 
intrusive character to each single maternal behaviours occurring in a given time unit, such 
as rough handling of the infant, poking, pulling, tickling, interfering manipulation and 
using a loud tone of voice (Cohn et al., 1990; Diego et al., 2002; Malphurs et al., 1996b), 
and/or an angry tone of voice (Tronick and Weinberg, 1997). Overall, in this model the 
level of intrusiveness was determined by the amount of intrusive behaviours demonstrated 
by mothers. 
A recent coding scale based on the MPP, the Infant and Caregiver Engagement 
Phases (ICEP, Weinberg & Tronick, 1999; adapted by Reck et al, 2011) has identified 
intrusive behaviours as those made regardless of the infant’s behaviour. Intrusive mothers 
are described by this instrument as “acting too loud, too expressively or too close to her 
child”. Despite its high level of details, in this coding scheme the judgment of whether a 
behaviour is intrusive or not seem to depend on the coder’s sensibility. 
Stern (2002) argued that intrusiveness, is too large as a behavioural unit, too global 
and vague for clinical or observation purposes; unpacking “intrusiveness” into smaller 
behaviours, such as head turns, gaze aversion or speed of physical approach would instead 
lead to its better clinical understanding. For instance, he described the over-stimulating 
behaviour of one mother and her three-years-old daughter as related to a difficulty in 
recognising the child’ affective shift 
Whenever a moment of mutual gaze occurred, the mother went immediately into 
high-gear stimulating behaviors, producing a profusion of fully displayed, high-
intensity, facial and vocal infant elicited social behavior. Jenny invariably broke 
gaze rapidly. Her mother never interpreted this temporary face and gaze aversion as 
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a cue to lower her level of behavior, nor would she let Jenny self-control the level 
by gaining distance (p. 135). 
Stern seems to accept to use intrusiveness as a behavioural category, but highlights that 
maternal behaviours are dynamically influenced moment-by-moment by those of the child. 
Thus, maternal intrusiveness has to be observed and described in relation to the child’s 
behaviour. However, intrusive behaviours have often been described as maternal initiatives 
towards the infant, but rarely seen as responses elicited by the infant’s behaviour. Recent 
studies have investigated the influence of the infants’ conduct on the mothers’ intrusive 
behaviours, suggesting that these behaviours are not only expression of an individual 
maternal style, but also a response to different types of infant initiations (Bell & Chapman, 
1986; Lloyd & Masur, 2014). For example, maternal intrusive utterances appeared more 
likely to be preceded by disengagements or attentional shifts by the infant (Masur, Flynn, & 
Lloyd, 2013). Beebe (2006) has argued that any intrusive behaviour on the mother’s side 
might be elicited by the infant’s withdrawn from the ongoing interaction, which in turn 
would foster a maternal intrusive response. In other words, maternal intrusiveness and 
infant withdrawal would represent two faces of the same interactional dynamic.  
Postpartum depression (PPD) 
Most of the past and current research investigating maternal intrusiveness has been 
applied in the study of clinical populations, particularly in the case of postpartum 
depression (PPD), as research in this field has also been influenced by the Mutual 
Regulation theory. PPD is a common psychological disorder that afflicts around 10% of 
new mothers (Cooper & Murray, 1997). Women suffering from this disorder typically 
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experience dysphoric mood along with other symptoms such as disturbances in sleep, 
appetite, psychomotricity, and they may have fatigue, guilt and suicidal thoughts (O' Hara, 
1997); it may have a prenatal onset and it usually lasts two to six months after birth 
(Cooper & Murray, 1997). Maternal depression may influence infants’ early interaction 
experiences and several studies have claimed its association with later difficulties in 
children’s emotional, cognitive and self-regulatory capacities (Murray, 1992; Murray & 
Cooper, 1997). Yet, the nature and extent of this influence is not fully clear and the 
literature on the topic is still controversial (Lovejoy et al., 2000; Murray et al., 1996).  
Most of the studies exploring early interactions in the case of PPD described 
mothers' behaviour as either intrusive or withdrawn (Murray & Cooper, 1997). 
Intrusiveness in postpartum depression has been predominantly related to dimensions such 
as over-control and over-stimulation (Ricks, 1981). Another dimension often related is 
maternal sensitivity, defined as giving appropriate differentiating responses, the ability to 
get pleasure from the baby’s reciprocity and the initiation of interactions (Rutter,1972), and 
directiveness (McDonald & Pien 1982; Pine, 1992). Beebe et al. (2008) have distinguished 
a specific aspect of physical behaviours, touch, as intrusive in some mothers with 
depressive symptoms. They suggested that mothers with depressive symptoms spent twice 
the time in intrusive touch as control mothers, decreasing their touch coordination with that 
of their infant and resulting in a more intrusive and less sensitively coordinated touch.  
However, some inconsistencies have emerged in how intrusiveness has been 
described and later applied to research on clinical populations. Murray et al. (1996), for 
instance, distinguished sensitivity from intrusiveness, considering the former as mainly 
constituted by maternal warmth and acceptance, and the latter as observable in behaviours 
that physically restrain the child activity such as cutting across, taking over, or blocking 
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movements. Sensitivity and intrusiveness are thus considered as two distinct dimensions. 
On the contrary, other studies have identified (a lack of) sensitivity at the core of maternal 
intrusiveness in PPD (Cohn et al., 1990; Campbell et al., 1995). In addition, some studies 
have marked “eliciting behaviours” as intrusive (e.g. Field, 1977; Field, Healy, Goldstein, 
& Guthertz, 1990), whereas others have considered those behaviours as non-intrusive, 
resulting in a general confusion across studies on how to interpret findings on the mothers’ 
behaviour (Cohn et al., 1986). These inconsistencies highlight a general lack of clarity on 
how to conceptualise and measure intrusiveness in clinical research, as also pointed out by 
Stern (2002), and the employment of behavioural categories that are too vague and not 
theoretically validated. 
Another critical point has emerged out of current behavioural categorisations. 
Although inspired by the Mutual Regulation Theory, implying that each behaviours only 
acquires meaning in relation to that of the other, intrusiveness has been identified through 
single actions such as touching, pulling, tickling as coding indexes per se, regardless of the 
ongoing interaction and the infant’s behaviour. Aspects of mutuality and reciprocity of 
early interactions are completely lost in this picture, making intrusiveness a weak compass 
for exploring successful and flawed dynamics between mothers and infants.  
Finally, mainstream descriptions of intrusiveness do not consider contextual 
elements contributing to define the framework in which the interaction develops. Early 
social games played by mothers and infants as early as 3 months, for instance, seem to have 
remarkable variance in their structure, the amount of physical contact by the mother, the 
infant’s position and the possibilities for her to move (Fantasia et al, 2014). During these 
games the mother is continuously pulling, poking, shaking, holding the infant’s hand, and 
the infant enjoys it. Yet, there is no doubt that these behaviours are not ‘intrusive’ if 
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intended in a negative or disruptive way, but rather functional to entertain the infant. 
In light of these critical points, the present study aims at investigating whether 
intrusiveness, as it has been defined so far, 1) is a valid and reliable behavioural category; 
2) has analytical power in observing how different maternal modes of organising the 
interaction configure opportunities to participate for infants.  
5.2. Method 
Five interactional episodes involving four 3-months-old infants and their mothers were 
selected for this study. These data were part of a corpus of more than 40 videorecordings, 
collected at the University Clinic of Heidelberg by Corinna Reck and her colleagues in 
2011. 
The original study 
The original study by Reck et al. (2011) included a sample of 28 German mothers 
with current depressive disorders (all diagnosed according to the ICD-109) and their 3-
months-olds infants (17 male and 11 female infants) receiving inpatient treatment at the 
mother–infant unit of the psychiatric University Hospital in Heidelberg. Data from a second 
group of 34 non-depressed mothers and 3-months-olds infants (24 males and 10 females) 
were also collected. Infants in both groups were healthy at birth, with a gestational age of 
no less than 36 weeks. Mother and infants dyads were observed in the clinic research 
laboratory. The experimental procedure was based on a face-to-face still-face paradigm 
                                                
9ICD-10 is the 10th revision of the International Statistical Classification of 
Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD), a medical classification list by the World 
Health Organisation (WHO). 	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(Tronick et al., 1979; Weinberg et al., 2006), were infants sat in a babyseat facing their 
mother, also seated. The procedure consisted in three episodes, each lasting 2 min: an initial 
face-to-face episode followed by a still-face episode and a reunion episode. The Infant and 
Caregiver Engagement Phases (ICEP, Weinberg & Tronick, 1999; see above for a more 
detailed description) was used for coding mother and infant behaviour. Results showed that 
dyads with depressed mothers presented higher proportions of negative engagement, 
described as withdrawn, intrusive and hostile behaviours. More information about these 
data can be found in the paper presenting the original study. 
The present study 
The selection of the five episodes involving the four dyads (two clinical and two 
non-clinical), followed a phase of intensive video observations; the episodes chosen 
presented similar maternal behaviours (e.g. episodes 1 and 2, and episodes 4 and 5) and 
behaviours that would fall into the current definitions of intrusiveness (episode 3). Initially, 
each episode was observed and transcribed by two researcher blind to the mother’s status 
(depressed or non-depressed). Then a sequential microanalysis of each episode was 
developed focusing on aspects of both the mother’s and infant’s conduct, including 
affective expressions, movements, posture, vocalisation and gaze, and the way these were 
organised into sequences of turns, pauses, repetitions. 
All the selected episodes were analysed using the ELAN software, which allows the 
simultaneous transcriptions of behaviours of both the mother and the infant on the same 
timeline. Participants have been given fictional names to ensure confidentiality (Table 5.1.) 
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Table 5.1. Names and episode number for each dyad 
 
5.3. Microanalysis of Mother-Infant Interactions 
Alignment and persistence 
Episode 1 
The first part of the microanalysis explores two dimensions of the interactional dynamics 
between mother and infant: Persistency (i.e. repeating a behaviour for a considerable 
amount of time regardless of the other’s behaviour) and alignment (i.e. behaviour is 
changed and adjusted according to the other’s behaviour).  
Episode 1 begins with Jack and Jenny at the end of a 3.5s coordinated sequence of 
circular arms movements. The mother is leaning forward snapping her right hand fingers 
while moving the arm, and the infant is performing similar movements with his left arm 
(Figure 5.1a). At the end of this sequence, Jack starts retreating his left arm from the 
coordinated activity, while Jenny continues snapping her fingers at the infant’s eye level. 
Then the infant vocalises and brings his left hand into the mouth; the mother reacts with a 
vocalisation of a similar tone (“ah hha”) but remains in a leaning posture and keeps 
Name of the Mother Name of the Infant Episode number Status 
Jenny Jack 1 Clinical 
Clare Charlie 2 Non clinical 
Sara Jim 3 and 4 Clinical 
Amy Mike 5 Non clinical 
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snapping the fingers very close to the infant’s eyes (Figure 5.1b). In terminal overlap with 
the maternal vocalisation, Jack covers his face with both arms and wipes his eyes until his 
body is completely folded in and turned on to the right side of the seat with eyes closed 
(Figure 5.1c).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jenny keeps smiling and continues with her movements, until Jack looks at her and 
vocalises with a more cry-like sound compared to the previous one (Figure 5.1d). At this 
the mother stops the snapping and turns from smiling to a facial expression of concern, 
vocalises again with a corresponding tone (“uo oo”). She escalates the level of her 
stimulation even more and touches Jack’s hands and chest. The episode ends with Jack 
frowning, keeping his body folded while the mother is still touching him on the chest.  
This episode shows that, while the mother is responsive to one type of Jack’s action 
(i.e. responding contingently to the infant’s vocalisation), she does not pick up the general 
configuration of his behaviour; Jenny responds to the infant’s shift to a different 
interactional modality (voice) by both vocalising after him and reinforcing her snapping 
a b c
 
d
 
Figure 5.1. Jack and Jenny 
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movements, without read Jack’s changes in vocalisation and posture as a withdrawal, or 
sign of a possible distress. Jenny’s affect in reaction to the first change in the infant’s 
behaviour (when he retreats the arm and starts mouthing the hand) lacks attunement with 
the affective downward shift displayed by the infant. When she eventually aligns with his 
affective state after his distressed cry it is too late to restore a reciprocal interaction. 
The succession of movements by the mother appears repetitive and not modulated, 
with no clear distinction of structural elements, such as opening and closing, or space for 
transitions created by clear-cut turn formats. The patterns of mother’s movements does not 
allow for the infant’s initiating or complementary moves, so he can only withdraw from the 
interaction or communicate discomfort outside the main interactional line (as he indeed 
does). 
Episode 2 
Episode 2 describes a mother, Clare, also using her hands to entertain Charlie, her 
infant, yet the structure and affective tone of this dyad’s interaction differs from the one 
described above. The episode begins with the mother moving the right hand close to the 
infant’s leg, vocalising with an interrogative tone (single utterance not understandable) and 
a rather furrowed face. Charlie, neutral up to that point, suddenly smiles broadly as Clare 
vocalises, just before she turns into a silence of 0.44s. The infant then bursts out into a loud 
laughter (Figure 5.2a), to which the mother immediately responds to with further laughter 
accompanied by a verbal confirmation (“hi ya ah”), and head nodding (Figure 5.2b). 
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After this, Charlie keeps laughing and thrashing arms, and shows an accentuated 
facial expression of mouth broadly opened, which is similar to that of the mother. The 
mother then continues to move her hand and head until the infant signals an affective 
downgrade, moving from laughing to smiling (Figure 5.2c). Thus, she makes another brief 
pause of approximately 0.3s, during which Charlie yawns briefly and then smiles (Figure 
5.3a). This second pause is a contingent response by the mother to Charlie’s early sign of 
withdrawal which allows the infant to have a break from the interactional stimulation.  
After this first sequence, the mother resumes the hand movements, increasing the 
amplitude of her movement and accentuating her facial expressions. Yet, this time Charlie 
does not laugh, but keeps smiling for less than a second and then yawns again (Figure 
5.3b). He then starts clasping his hands and brings them into the mouth (Figure 5.3c), with 
a frowning face. At this, the mother makes a short pause, and then touches the infant’s 
a b c 
Figure 5.2. Charlie and Clare, part I 
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hand. Charlie then gazes away and the mother stops moving the hand, and backs away. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this episode Clare uses different multimodal resources in a consistent way to 
engage the infant. The interactional sequencing involves pauses which may represent 
transitional spaces, where turns can pass on. The episode is organised in brief strings of 
multimodal activity, each followed by a pause. The infant’s behaviour seems to happen in 
terminal position with the mother’s action, and the mother’s subsequent action shows 
adjustments according to Charlie’s level of intensity and his general behavioural 
configuration (such as facial expressions, quality of movements, vocalisations). For 
instance, Clare’s second pause happens when Charlie had decreased his level of activity 
and started yawning. In other words, the level of activity is adapted to the infant, as the 
mother shows online adjustments to match the infant’s behaviour. From there, the dyad can 
negotiate whether to go on within the same activity or change it. 
The mothers presented so far may well be described as equally intrusive according 
d e f 
Figure 5.3. Charlie and Clare, part II 
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to the current descriptions of intrusiveness, as they both occupy the infants’ space with their 
hands and body. Yet, fundamental qualitative differences have emerged through the 
microanalysis, in the way actions are patterned into sequences or turn formats, and acquire 
different meanings in relation to their temporal and affective quality, such as contingency, 
persistence, and consistency. Clare’s behaviour can be described as “dialogic”, as she 
organises the interaction in short turn-like formats, constructed by acting upon the infant’s 
behaviour and incorporating it in multimodal sequences of action (Berducci, 2010). In this 
way the infant is embedded in the interaction as an agentive participant in a co-constructed 
exchange. On the contrary, Jenny’s behaviour may appear rather “monologic”, as the 
interaction is not modulated on the infant’s behaviours, neither patterned in turn-taking 
sequences with a narrative excursion (Brazelton, Koslowski & Main, 1974; Ratner & 
Bruner, 1978). 
Episode 3 
Episode 3 presents Sara interacting with her infant (Jim) by rocking the babyseat on 
which Jim is seated. A few seconds into the rocking movements had been successful in 
catching Jim’s attention, who then started looking at the mother. At the beginning of the 
selected episode, the infant and the mother are both smiling at each other while the 
babyseat is rocked back and forth (Figure 5.4.).
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After approximately 2s Jim starts waving his right hand reaching out towards the 
mother while looking at her (Figure 5.5.). Sara does not respond to this initiative and keeps 
moving the seat, smiling. The infant holds this position for almost one second, although the 
bouncing thrust produced by the rocking movements makes it more difficult for him to do 
so. Then, Jim shifts his facial expression from a smiling face to a neutral one, and he then 
starts to lift himself up by moving the chin and shoulders forward (Figure 5.6.).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Jim reaches out with his arm 
Figure 5.4. Jim and Sara at the beginning of the interaction 
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The infant goes on making the same movements of coming forward with raised 
hand, for approximately 3’’ since he raised his hand for the first time. Sara ignores this 
move by Jim and continues with the same rocking movements and a smiling face. Then, 
with a brisk movement, she holds Jim’s wrists and start to pull him up. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although by rocking the seat the mother shows a rather creative way of entertaining 
the infant (given the limited possibilities offered by the face-to-face situation), she misses 
the opportunity to change the content of the interaction by re-using the infant’s behaviour. 
Indeed, Jim’s behaviours display that he is disattending the mother’s line of action to 
introduce a different type of action (and affective shift) which is not recognised by Sara. 
Equally, the affective shifts going from smile to a light frown is not mirrored or responded 
to. On the contrary, she persists with her movements, which are not sequentially organised 
or patterned, and make it more difficult for the infant to join in the interaction. Similarly to 
what we observed in episode 1, a persistent behaviour by the mother, with no intervals or 
pauses, results in the infant’s disengagement with the main line of interaction. It can be 
argued that these moves are attempts by the infants to interrupt the current course of action 
Figure 5.6. Sara keeps rocking the babyseat 
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by the mother and open a different sequence. Whatever the goal of the infant’s behaviour, it 
is clear that a turn-taking format keeps the infants “in” and allows them to modulate their 
participation on the mother’s level of activity, whereas persistency and un-modulation 
conduce to disengagement and affective misalignment.  
Unlike the previous episodes, however, this sequence may not be coded as intrusive, 
as the mother does not directly interfere with the infant’s activity nor is she invading the 
infant’s space. 
Sequential structuring and temporal coordination 
In the following two episodes two dyads are analysed as they engage in a series of pulling 
up sequences. Similar maternal behaviours are analysed to show how differences in terms 
of participation and alignment do not only depend on the behaviour alone or the temporal 
coordination, but are rather strictly connected to dimensions of sequentiality and structuring 
of the interaction. 
Episode 4 
This episode follows the interaction of the dyad described in the episode 3. The 
mother has just stopped the rocking movements to hold Jim’s wrist and start pulling him 
up. Yet, the infant seems not prepared for this initiative, and when the pulling movement 
begins his arms are flat, outstretched but not stiff and the body is laying on to the seat 
(Figure 5.7.) 
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The pulling up force is therefore all on the mother’s side. Jim’s head is bent 
forward, embedded into the outstretched arms pulled by the mother, so that he cannot gaze 
to the mother. When he is completely lifted up the space between Jim and the mother is still 
considerably wide and the lifting looks incomplete (Figure 5.8.). Jim now briefly looks at 
the mother with a neutral facial expression, while she keeps a static smile unchanged 
throughout the entire episode. The infant quickly shifts his gaze and starts to move back on 
to the babyseat. His descending movements are brisk and the head is aside, floppy, despite 
the mother supporting hold. Two more lifting actions follow, lasting respectively 2.5s and 
3s, and each coming quickly after the previous one with a brief or no pauses in between. 
Over each episode the dyad acquires more coordination of movements, and in the last 
episode Sara starts her pulling movement and takes over the infant’s lifting movement 
contingently after he had started to lift himself up, resulting in a very smooth transition. 
Figure 5.7. Jim is not ready for lifting up 
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Although increasing their temporal coordination, the interaction still appears as 
unsuccessful, as the mother’s keeps smiling while the infant shows a neutral face and seems 
rather passive, so that their affects are not aligned. The level of activity is not shaped on the 
infant’s affective state or behaviours, nor is it modulated by increasing or decreasing 
activity. The fast succession of lifting sequences, one straight after the other, is not 
organised in patterns of action spaced by intervals and presenting a clear narrative-like 
structure. Sequences of lifting have not clear boundaries which distinguish, for instance, the 
opening of the action to the closing, resulting in a series of movements that have no 
excursion or evolution.  
Episode 5 
In this episode a dyad (Mike and Amy) is engaged in a lifting up sequence similar 
Figure 5.8. The lifting appears more coordinated 
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to the previous one. The interaction starts with Amy noticing some lifting attempts by 
Mike, and verbally inviting him to do so (“Oh, willst du aufstehen?”; tr. “Oh, would you 
like to come up?”) (Figure 5.9a). Mike, whose gaze was away, now looks at the mother, 
smiles and starts to lift up first the legs and then the rest of the body. Sara responds to this 
initiative by upgrading the level of stimulation by laughing and with a verbal confirmation 
(“ah genau!”; tr. “ah, yes!”), and starts to pulling up the infant (Figure 5.9b).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The lifting proceeds with reciprocal gaze and smiling (Figure 5.9c), until Mike is at 
his maximum lifting eight and so close to Amy’s face that she gives him a kiss on the 
forehead (Figure 5.9d). In terminal overlap with the mother’s action, Mike slowly moves 
back in to the babyseat. Before the infant has completed his return to the seat, the mother 
anticipates the completion of the sequence by saying “Super”. A brief pause follows, in 
which the dyad gazes reciprocally until the mother makes a second invitation by asking 
Nochmal? (“Again?”), and projects the next action forward by counting Eins, Zwei, Drei 
(“One, two, three”). She then starts pulling Mike up into a new lifting. After this, three 
Figure 5.9. Mike and Amy, part I. 
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more lifting sequences follow, each spaced out by pauses (lasting approximately 1s).  
In its last lifting the dyad is well coordinated in negotiating the closure of activity. 
The action begins with the mother vocalising through accentuated opening movements of 
the mouth, immediately mirrored by Mike (Figure 5.10a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After approximately 0.8s, while the infant is still moving his mouth, Amy stops 
vocalising and starts pulling Mike up. He starts lifting with a slight delay. While Mike is 
still lifting up, Amy anticipates the completion of the action with a kiss on the infant’s 
forehead (Figure 5.10b). When the lifting is completed and Mikes is completely up, the 
mother’s kissing action is almost finished. The infant then quickly moves back on to the 
seat. While retreating, Mike does not look at the mother and put his hand into the mouth. 
The interaction closes with both participants displaying a neutral face (Figure 5.10c) and no 
further actions. 
Similarly to episode 4, the coordination of movements in this dyad increases over 
a b c 
Figure 5.10. Mike and Amy, part II. 
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time. However, in this interaction the mother encapsulates each lifting episode into a 
defined event with an opening and closing. In the first lifting, for instance, she does it by 
counting down (“one, two, three”), and verbally invites the infant (“do you want to come 
up?). She then marks the completion of the action with a kiss on the infant’s forehead, 
which functions as anticipatory contextualisation (Mehus, 2011) for the closure of the 
sequence. In the first sequence, the lifting closed with a comment by Amy marking the 
interactive success (“Super”, 0:10.81). This happens in each lifting of the sequence, with 
very minor changes between one lifting and the other, and leads the way for the next lifting 
action. On a broader perspective, this episode shows two different temporal levels as 
described by Kaye (1979): A level in which actions run horizontally over time represented 
by, for instance, the reciprocal gazing, and a vertical level, hierarchically organised, in 
which actions are nested. In this way the mother provides a frame with her sequencing of 
the interaction containing the infant’s behaviour, and at the same time creates moments of 
affective mirroring. A coherent dynamical interplay between these two levels may support 
(or constrain) the infant’s participation in everyday routines, transforming sequences of 
action in enjoyable moments within a clear, predictable structure. 
Although the activities of the two last episodes may appear similar, considerable 
differences disclose through the microanalysis. Coordination of both dyads increases over 
the course of the episode, as each lifting results smoother than the previous one and better 
physically adjusted. Nevertheless, in episode 5 the mother acts upon the infant’s initiative 
to lift himself up, so that the infant can participate in the interaction that, in a way, he has 
himself proposed. On her side, the mother organises the interaction in sequential micro-
episodes presenting clear boundaries (e.g. opening and closure) and pauses in between. 
These boundaries are signalled to the infant through increasing and decreasing intensity of 
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activity (increasing or decreasing tone of voice, acceleration or deceleration of 
movements), upgrades of affective tones and the different use of communicative 
modalities, (e.g. a kiss to mark the end of the lifting, or the verbal preparation for the 
lifting). Altogether, these micro-episodes evolve and unfold into a narrative-like sequence, 
in which motor and affective coordination increases over time and ends with both the 
partner disengaging from the interaction.  
In episode 4, instead, we saw that the beginning of the sequence is not marked, and 
as a result, the infant appears not ready for the lifting in the first sequence Furthermore, 
there is no evolution of the interactive quality in this dyad, except for the temporal 
coordination which increases over time. The lifting sequences are constructed over a single 
resource (physical movements), resulting less entertaining for the infant and less enjoyable 
overall. Finally the mother does not immediately pick up the infant’s initiative to change 
the interaction. 
5.4. Discussion 
The present work aimed at rethinking the concept of intrusiveness by exploring the 
consistency of its behavioural descriptors, and its efficacy in capturing the interactional 
dynamics which may restrict the infant’s participation in interaction. To begin with, 
attention was drawn to issues regarding the consistency of categories describing maternal 
intrusiveness, which are 1) the lack of a general agreement about definitions and coding 
models; 2) a progressive distancing from the Mutual Regulation theory, on which most of 
the current descriptive categories are based; and 3) the pitfall of assigning a pre-defined 
meaning to single behaviours without considering the context in which they occur. This 
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study aimed at further exploring these issues, analysing in depth examples of behaviours 
that would fall under the intrusive or non-intrusive category according to ICEP, a coding 
systems currently used in postpartum depression research (see section 5.1.). 
From the analysis of episodes 1 to 3 two dimensions have been identified, which 
discriminate between interactions apparently involving the same type of macro-behaviours 
(e.g. waving hands or pulling the infant up). The first one is persistency, defined as 
repeating a movement or action for a considerable amount of time regardless of the other’s 
behaviour. As emerged in the microanalysis, persistent behaviours appeared linked to a 
general difficulty in recognising the infants’ signals, in terms of affective shifts or 
initiatives. In this sense, these behaviours lacked of reciprocity and failed to acknowledge 
infants as agentful partners, limiting their possibilities for interacting. In this sense, it is not 
surprising that episodes characterised by persistent behaviours lasted shortly and were often 
affectively unsuccessful, resulting in the infants disengaged from the main interactional 
line, either by physically retreating (episode 1) or through affective dis-alignment (episode 
3). 
Contrarily to persistency, alignment seemed to be an essential positive factor for the 
quality and duration of the interaction. Alignment is defined here as reciprocal, online 
behavioural adjustments to the other’s behaviour, which enabled the mother to respond to 
the infants’ signals and adapt the ongoing action accordingly. In episode 2, for instance, the 
mother paused the action after the infant’s yawning, decreasing the level of stimulation and 
signalling the possibility to a pause from the interaction if needed. This, in a sense, gave the 
infant the possibility to remain in the interaction with a lower profile, instead of disengage, 
making the interaction lasting longer. Issues of persistency and alignment were also visible 
in episodes 4 and 5. In analysing these two episodes concerning two dyads engaged in pull-
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up sequences, it was emphasised the role of action boundaries and overall sequential 
structure in facilitating participation and engagement. These dimensions appeared to be 
essential for the interactional success, as emerged in episode 5, through a qualitative 
evolution of the interaction, sequence after sequence, where the series of lifting actions had 
a narrative-like format – started with an introduction, proceeding through an intense phase 
and then concluding on a slower and less animated action level. Each sequence in this 
episode presented repetitions (the kiss on the infants’ forehead), pauses and clear marking 
of boundaries for opening and closure which supported the infant’s participation by 
creating interactional space.  
This evolution was instead missing in episode 4, where the only progress concerned 
the temporal coordination in the lifting/pulling movements. Indeed, in this episode actions 
were not sequenced and divided by recognisable boundaries and intervals, leaving no slots 
in which the infant’s action could be placed. In other words, the infant had no affordances 
for moves in the same activity domain of the mother, and thus no chances to actively 
influence the caregiver’s action. 
Overall, the microanalysis revealed that maternal behaviours were similar on the 
surface, but differed when more subtle dimensions of behaviours were considered 
dynamically, in their evolution over time. These dimensions highlighted that the description 
of behaviours as intrusive per se was not significant nor sufficient for understanding the 
interactional dynamics between the mother and the infant, as actions never happened as 
single instances. Rather, maternal behaviours were patterned into sequences of multimodal 
actions, often in the format of turn-taking, that presented a defined excursion and duration 
with respect to what the infant was doing. Looked from a temporal perspective, these 
behaviours presented a variety of aspects that facilitated or restricted the infant’s 
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participation as well as the general affective outcomes. These observations are in line with 
previous findings of infant research, showing, for instance, how interactive turn formats are 
grounded in the maternal sensibility to detect and align with the temporal variations of the 
infant’s behaviours (Brazelton, Koslwoski & Main, 1974; Kaye, 1977).  
It is important to stress here that this study did not aim to compare two populations 
(i.e. depressed versus non-depressed mothers), but rather to unpack the interactional 
dimensions at play in episodes identified as intrusive under mainstream descriptions. 
Although evidence from the microanalysis suggests that the most marked difficulties in 
aspects of sequentiality, alignment and timing appeared to involve dyads with postpartum 
depressed mothers, at the same time none of the behaviours observed across dyads was 
intrusive in itself. Even the mother’s persistent snapping of the fingers, observed in episode 
1, was not problematic as a movement per se, but in its dis-alignment with the infant’s 
behaviour over time. This suggests that current descriptions of intrusiveness as pre-defined, 
individual behaviours might be not discriminative enough in investigating early mother-
infant dynamics. Furthermore, given the evidence that results on intrusiveness in PPD are 
inconsistent and contradictory, a more-naturalistic and observational approach to mother-
infant dynamics, were mothers have the possibility to engage in fully completed activities 
using a variety of resources available (e.g. toys) may help to clarify the influence of PPD on 
infants’ development. 
Additionally, the way intrusive behaviours have been coded so far seem to assume 
that all maternal behaviours are initiatives (such as cutting across or interrupting the 
infant’s action) (Beebe, 2006; Goodwin & Heritage, 1990; Ochs, 2012), but the 
microanalysis presented in this work has demonstrated that this was not the case. Most of 
the behaviours identified as intrusive by mainstream research, on the contrary, are 
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necessary manoeuvres to commence a new action, or to respond to the infant’s initiative (as 
in episodes 3 and 5). Additionally, actions such as holding the infant’s hand, pulling, 
physically invading the infant’s space or interrupting an ongoing action are part of the way 
everyday situations are accomplished and regulated by adults, who perform actions with 
and on infants, without whom infants would not survive.  
This study has therefore challenged the usefulness of considering sets of single 
behaviours pulled together in a general category to label the appropriateness of maternal 
conducts in clinical population. Indeed, as strongly suggested by previous research on 
language development and socialisation (Ochs & Schieffelin, 1984; Bateson, M.C., 1994; 
Duranti, 2000), the same maternal behaviour may assume completely different meanings 
and functions according to the sociocultural norms and nurturing practices and the specific 
maternal style (Mead & MacGregor, 1951; Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986; Keller et al., 2004). 
Recent findings have revealed cultural variability in the temporal organisation of mother-
infant interactions in terms of length of intervals, overlaps and use of nonverbal resources, 
and how these aspects are dynamically affected by changes in the living contexts (i.e. 
migration) (Gratier, 2003). Any definition of single maternal behaviours as non-appropriate 
or intrusive should take this aspect into account. 
To conclude, current definitions of intrusiveness encompass a range of behaviours 
that restrict or reduce the infant’s interactive participation. This study has demonstrated that 
specific aspects of the maternal organisation of the interaction – sequentiality, alignment, 
persistency and temporal coordination - play an essential part in supporting the infants’ 
interactive agency and participation. Clearly, it is not possible to ignore that these aspects 
were played differently by the mothers with postpartum depression observed in this study. 
Yet, this may be due to a variety of factors, including the pressure of the experimental 
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condition, which may have induced PPD mothers to overstimulate the children or keep an 
‘upbeat’ attitude throughout. 
Whether these interactional patterns characterise mothers with psychological 
difficulties more than non-clinical mothers, and whether they extend over the first months 
of the child life is for further research to establish. Will there be a chance for these dyads to 
develop successful communicative interactions, even if they were relatively unsuccessful at 
an early stage? The differences in shaping actions boundaries and sequential developments 
identified in this study may be worth exploring in further research in clinical populations.  
5.5. Conclusions 
The present work does not aim to devalue the considerable work done by researchers in the 
past, especially in postpartum depression. Furthermore, the limited number of observations 
does not make it exhaustive. However, the sequential and multimodal analysis inspired by 
Conversation Analysis, including recent development in infant research (Berducci, 2010; 
Nomikou & Rohlfing, 2011) appeared to be powerful in discriminating between 
characteristics of behaviour that may impact on the child’s behaviour in different ways, 
thus gaining a more subtle understanding of different types of dysfunctional interactional 
patterns that may occur. Thus, the present study may be considered a step on the way to the 
development of new conceptualisations, ethnomethodologically oriented, that would inform 
the theory and method of future research. 
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6. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
The studies presented in this thesis aimed to explore how infants become cooperative 
participants in contexts of natural co-actions with their caregivers, through a non-inferential 
view on cooperation. The problem of “representation” was therefore transformed into the 
analysis which allowed for a deeper understanding of the dynamic vitality and signals that 
make cooperative living and acting possible. To do so, a look beyond current definitions 
was needed, to explore instead the contexts and modalities in which individuals (and not 
only infants) negotiate their participation by interacting. The notion of participation has 
been largely used through several disciplines inspired by the concept of participation 
framework proposed by Goffman (1981). Within Conversation Analysis, the issue of 
participation has been revisited within an embodied perspective (Goodwin & Goodwin, 
2004; Streeck, Goodwin & LeBaron, 2011; Goodwin, 2013), revealing its dynamic, 
changing and complex organization, as well as the importance for its organization of 
multimodal resources, specific formats, and changing configurations.  
A theoretical shift was therefore endorsed in the works presented in this thesis: from 
cooperative actions defined as a set of interlocked, predefined actions performed under a 
clear agreement on goals and roles, to a view of cooperating as an intrinsic part of any 
interactional process. A process that involves participation, implying that the range of 
possible cooperative activities depends on many different factors at play, such as the 
characteristics of participants and their relational history, the social context within which 
they move and the complexity and nature of the task. This redefinition was first laid out in 
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the (very cooperative!) work with Hanne de Jaegher (chapter 2), where the spectrum of 
ways in which individuals participate in cooperative encounters was broadened to take into 
account formal encounters in which two or more people explicitly agree on a task and roles, 
to everyday situations were individuals implicitly or naturally contribute to the each other’s 
actions, e.g. to make space on a very crowded bus for someone that wants to get in. In line 
with the Conversation Analysis view, the work proposes that any social interaction presents 
intrinsic cooperative aspects, in its being a practice of making sense of the other with the 
other. Interactors are not contributing to a shared goal by simply placing their pre-defined 
or pre-agreed individual contribution; rather, they are dynamically co-participating in the 
definition and building up of that shared activity. 
Integrated with previous research on the development of language and socialisation 
(Kaye, 1979; Trevarthen, 1979; Ochs & Schieffelin, 1984, 1995; Berducci, 2010), this new 
perspective has enabled exploring cooperation in infancy as a dual process: on the one 
hand, infants naturally participate in, and actively support, joint activities, part of which are 
the daily routines for their care and entertainment; on the other hand, joint activities are also 
learning contexts, where infants make experience of and develop cooperative participation. 
What makes this dual process possible? Three aspects were identified and discussed in the 
studies presented in this thesis as particularly important for the development of 
participation in joint routines: The interactional organisation, multimodality and 
predictability. Each of them is connected to the other two but also representing an 
influential factor in its own right.  
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6.1. Interactional organisation 
Learning to participate in social interactions is a complex process, fundamentally related 
with the emergence of communicative skills. The practices and contexts of language 
acquisition have been studied in the forms of units of participation (Duranti, 2000) and the 
relations between communicative strategies and social organisation (Ochs, Schegloff & 
Thompson, 1996). It has been proposed that language reflects aspects of the social order 
(M.H. Goodwin, 1990), that is, the way in which a conversation is organised enacts 
modalities of social organisation. The interactional organisation (or design) of early 
caregiver-infant interactions such as sequentiality, turn-taking, contingency and timing 
regulate the infant’s participation: the rhythm and organisation of feeding cycles, for 
instance, are negotiated in turn formats which take into account the infant’s initiatives and 
pauses as well as those of the mother (Kaye & Brazelton, 1971).  
Play interactions in older infants (between 5 to 9 months of age) appeared to have a 
clear turn-taking structure, finely patterned and embedded in a temporal evolution (Watson, 
1972; Stern, 1974; Ratner & Bruner, 1977). Our study on play routines (chapter 3) showed 
that earlier forms of play routines, such as nursery-rhymes, are designed to entertain infants 
by acting with and upon them (Berducci, 2010), e.g. where the mother jointly claps her 
hands with those of the infant. In doing so, mothers physically sustain the infant’s 
participation by enacting and incorporating it into the interactive sequence.  
The microanalysis of face-to-face interactions presented in chapter 5 revealed that 
mothers engaged the infants in sequences of turns and pauses even in a situation with 
limited resources (no toys available, very little space for movements), which supported the 
mutual participation. Most surprisingly, these interactions also appeared to share some 
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aspects of the “conversational grammar” used by adults in conversations, e.g. in the way 
patterns of actions and gaps are organised.  
6.2. Multimodality 
Multimodality, described as the simultaneous use of different communicative resources, 
Lerner et al., 2011) appeared to be an essential feature in promoting and sustaining infants’ 
participation in the joint routines investigated in this thesis. The microanalysis of mothers’ 
and infants’ behaviour in chapter 5 showed that some configurations of motor and vocal 
actions constrained or facilitated the infant’s contribution to the interaction. However, even 
when these two modalities were not used simultaneously but in succession, they functioned 
as key elements in creating an interaction space for the infant. For instance, vocalising 
“one, two, three” before the beginning of the lifting action, the mother allowed the infant to 
ready himself for the next action. Furthermore, the ability to switch from one modality to 
another (e.g. from singing and gesturing to talk) appeared to be an effective strategy that 
mothers used to regulate the level of stimulation and align to the infant’s state.  
Results from our study on early play routines suggested that the multimodal 
performance of early play routines was a key element to make the games successful and 
entertaining, but also recognisable by the infants. When the vocal and kinetic resources 
were separated and the games performed unimodally, the infants’ motor and affective 
participation decreased. Most surprisingly, this happened regardless of the mothers’ 
accentuated attempts to maintain an affective engagement with the infant.  
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6.3. Predictability 
A central aspect of mother-infant routines is their being repetitive and with a recognisable 
form across different environments (and different resources available), making them largely 
predictable for the infant. The findings presented in this thesis revealed two aspects of 
predictability: 1) single movements, gestures, vocalisations or multimodal combinations of 
them appear repeatedly within the same sequence or sequences in interactions. For instance, 
two out of three social games observed in chapter 3 presented the same combination of 
gestures and vocalisation at the beginning and end of the game; 2) structural aspects 
organise the joint routine into a narrative-like format, presenting clear opening and closing 
phases and a peak of activity in the middle. This format makes the interaction more 
predictable, as it enables the recognition of each phase as they unfold and the anticipation 
of the next one (Fasulo, 1999). These structural aspects allowed the games to maintain a 
close temporal structure despite the mode of presentation. Chapter 5 presents a nice 
example of a mother-infant engaged in a series of lifting sequences (visibly structured in a 
narrative format) which become increasingly coordinated and synchronised after each 
repetition. The results presented in chapter 4 as evidence of infants’ participation in pick-up 
interactions also seems to suggest that joint routines enable infants not only to predict the 
mother’s behaviour, but also to complement and support it through specific functional 
actions.  
As Bruner (1985) has proposed, formats of actions become increasingly 
conventionalised over time, and develop in ways that are less idiosyncratic and more 
recognisable. The combination of the three aspects just described – the interactional 
organisation, multimodality and predictability – contribute to the process of 
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conventionalisation, that is, the way infants learn to anticipate when and how a partner’s 
behaviour will change and the intrinsically cooperative dimension created by mutually 
attending to and “commenting on” the same object (Kaye, 1979; Bruner & Sherwood, 
1981).  
6.4. Understanding and sharing intentions 
Mainstream accounts of cooperation have claimed that shared intentionality, broadly 
defined as mentally inferring the other’s intention in a joint action, is at the very basis of 
the ability to cooperate. As argued in chapter two, these approaches have explained shared 
intentionality from an observer’s perspective, but not from a participant’s one. Observers 
have to make inferences about others’ intentions or motives, but participants or co-actors 
directly perceive what the other is aiming to as recipients of the action under way. 
Participating in the same activity, attending to each other’s movements, vocalisations or 
gaze is enough to make other’s actions (and the intentions behind them) unambiguous.  
What is the role of joint routines in the development of intentionality? As already 
argued, the familiar and repetitive character of early routines makes the caregiver’s 
behaviour predictable. Previous studies have shown that infants can understand and 
anticipate other’s intentions-in-action, naturally complementing or supporting it (Reddy et 
al., 2013). The same seems to be true in familiar routines. As suggested by the findings 
presented in chapter 4, the mother’s intentions to pick the infant up are visible in the 
dynamical sequencing of her movements, from approach to lift. Infants’ contribution to the 
action is therefore not so much informed by the identification of intentions, as by the 
recognisability of emergent structures of action-in-progress. As Mehus (2011) suggests, 
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“caregivers are not operating with the assumption that the intentions that underlie [young 
children’s] action are stable and independently existing, but rather seen them as (…) 
resulting in differently understood acts” (p. 133). 
Shared intentionality may therefore be reframed in light of the assumption that 1) 
intentions are visible and embodied in actions and 2) interactions are conceived as mutually 
constructed and dynamically shaped by each participant’s action. Under this view, 
intentions are shared and co-constructed just as interactions are, emerging out of social 
(cooperative) interactions, rather than being a prerequisite for their occurrence.  
Thinking about intentions and shared intentions as acts, rather than mental, 
individual objects, allows us to explore the developmental processes within which infants 
learn to make sense of others’ behaviours and interact with them. In these “conversational 
negotiations” (Trevarthen, 1998; Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001) infants find their motives for 
participating in social interactions, namely, cooperating. 
6.5. Conclusions 
To summarise the main findings presented in this thesis, early joint routines appeared to be 
places where cooperative participation is practiced and learnt, even before the development 
of inferential abilities. This is possible because infants interact with caregivers in socially 
organised contexts. The sequential and turn-taking structure of these contexts constrains, 
reduces or facilitates the possibilities for infants’ participation, preparing the ground for 
later, more complex forms of interaction and communication. Overall, this thesis suggests 
that the observation of infant behaviour in daily, familiar practices, such as joint routines, 
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may reveal aspects of infants’ participation as competent and functional, which may not 
otherwise be observed in other (more artificial) contexts. 
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